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I. INTRODUCTION 
The world in which Department of Defense must operate has changed beyond 
the limits of the existing acquisition system's ability to adjust or evolve. It is not 
enough to improve the existing system. There must be a carefully planned, 
fundamental reengineering of each segment of the acquisition system so we can 
respond to the demands of the next decade. [Ref. 1, p. 8] 
As reflected above by Mrs. Colleen Preston, the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense 
(Acquisition Reform), Department of Defense (DoD) is "carefully" approaching acquisition 
reform in a manner to better serve our national interests. In concert with the White House's 
National Performance Review (NPR), acquisition reform provides an avenue towards 
streamlining Government by way of introducing innovative procurement methods that contribute 
to the elimination of red tape and excessive oversight. Accordingly, this thesis presents one facet 
of acquisition reform by way of presenting an alternative method, referred hereafter as the 
Second Price Sealed Bid (SPSB) method, used in the solicitation of Fixed-Firm Price (FFP) type 
Government contracts. 
A. THE SECOND PRICE SEALED BID METHOD: AN OVERVIEW 
The SPSB method is a derivative from the "second-price" sealed bid auctioning 
mechanism that was originally introduced by the economist William Vickery in 1961. [Ref. 2, p. 
20] Although limited studies and publications have addressed the second-price auctioning 
mechanism, very little, if any, literature has attempted to apply second-pricing in contract 
acquisition. 
In contracting for products and services the Government often uses the First Price Sealed 
Bid (FPSB) method in the solicitation of FFP type contracts1. Under the FPSB method, the 
Government issues a solicitation to prospective contractors who then submit their bids in a sealed 
envelope. On an appointed date and time, the envelopes are opened and put in full view of all 
contractors and Government officials. Under this type of solicitation, contract award 
determination is based upon the lowest bid offered. Accordingly, the contractor submitting the 
1
   The FPSB method is simply referred to by acquisition and contracting professionals as "sealed 
bidding." In that the SPSB method is currently not recognized as an accepted form of bidding, there is no 
common terminology to describe its use. 
lowest bid is awarded the contract and, after performance of the contract, is paid by the 
Government the amount of their bid. Hence, the amount paid to the contractor would be referred 
to as the FPSB price. Under the SPSB method, the contractor submitting the lowest bid is also 
awarded the contract. In contrast to the FPSB method, however, the contractor is paid the bid 
price submitted by the next-to-lowest contractor, the second price. 
As discussed in this thesis, the theory of the SPSB method implies that, in a competitive 
environment, a contractor's best long-term pricing strategy for submitting bids is to bid their 
actual anticipated cost in providing a product or service. The incentives for bidding this amount 
are: 
• bidding higher than their actual anticipated cost increases the risk of not being the 
lowest bidder, therefore losing the award and, 
• bidding lower than their actual anticipated cost increases the risk of being awarded a 
contract in an unprofitable position (this would occur where the next-to-lowest bid is 
lower than the offeror's actual anticipated cost in providing a product or service). 
Continuing with this theory, determining an contractor's pricing strategy is dramatically 
simplified in that their optimal pricing strategy would always be to accumulate actual anticipated 
costs and bid this sum.2 The SPSB method: 
• eliminates the need to address uncertainties that surface when determining profit 
counter-strategies from competitors and, 
• reduces administrative costs required in compiling data necessary in determining a 
competitive profit position. 
Additionally, the SPSB method incentivizes contractors in becoming more cost efficient. 
The lower they are able to reduce costs, the higher their chances in winning a contract. 
Accordingly, price analysis and audits performed by the Government that are used in 
determining price reasonableness would, in theory, be lessened. In a competitive environment, 
free market forces between competing offerers would cause contractors to disclose their actual 
costs as reflected in their respective bid amounts. 
2
   The alternative of a buy-in strategy (i.e., the case where a contractor sets a bid price below his actual 
cost) to win an award may also be considered an element to a long-term strategy which will be discussed 
in further detail in this thesis. 
In exploring the SPSB method, this thesis analyzes its perceived benefits to Government 
contracting as it pertains to reductions in resources necessary in performing the procurement 
process (e.g., reductions in the Procurement Administrative Lead Time (PALT)) . As revealed in 
this thesis, a "carefully" structured analytical approach into the application of the SPSB Method 
is presented through 1) controlled experimentation, and 2) surveying of private industry and 
Government contracting activities. 
In short, the ultimate goal of this thesis is to contribute to acquisition reform through the 
exploration of alternatives in current Government contracting practices. Accordingly, this thesis 
highlights possible benefits and provides recommendations regarding the application of the 
SPSB method in Government contracting that may result in improving/refining long-run 
procurement efficiencies for DoD. 
B. RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
The primary research question for this thesis is as follows: 
Should the SPSB method be applied in the solicitation of Government contracts? 
The following are the subsidiary research questions: 
• What is the SPSB method as it pertains to Government contracting? 
• Why should the SPSB method be adopted by DoD? 
• Would the SPSB method be an accepted form of solicitation of contracts by 
Government and/or private industry? 
• What impediments exist that would preclude the application of the SPSB method in 
Government contracting? 
C. RESEARCH METHOD 
Information used in the preparation of this thesis was obtained through three primary 
methods; literature search, controlled experimentation, and surveying of both private industry 
and Government contracting professionals. 
3
 In general, PALT refers to the administrative time required by contracting offices to conduct a 
procurement request. [Ref. 3, p. 135] 
A literature search was conducted to obtain a comprehensive understanding of the second 
price economic theory that forms the basis for the application of the SPSB method in 
Government contracting. The compilation of literature materials resulted from the use of library 
catalogs and periodical index guides, in addition to referrals from various contracting and 
economic professionals interviewed. Books, periodicals, and various other publications that are 
pertinent to the nucleus of the author's research are found in the List of References. 
Controlled experimentation was conducted on 102 graduate students enrolled in various 
Systems Management curricula at the Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA. Their 
assistance was solicited in providing a basis for determining behavioral trends as they pertain to 
the application of the SPSB method. 
Mail surveys were offered to 28 private manufacturers and 73 Government contract 
commands and agencies. These surveys were sent primarily to determine if Government and/or 
private industry contracting communities understand and support the SPSB method. A list of 
those surveyed is found in Appendix A. Additionally, a sample of the survey can be found in 
Appendix B. 
D. SCOPE OF THESIS RESEARCH 
The thesis research is limited to the application of the SPSB method as it pertains to 
DoD contracting for services and materials under $100,000. However, additional inferences may 
be extrapolated from this research that are applicable to any sealed bid FFP type contract, 
regardless of monetary amount. As such, it is expected that much of the research presented in 
this thesis is pertinent to both private and Government contracting entities engaged in sealed bid 
FFP type contracting. 
E. ORGANIZATION OF STUDY 
In Chapter II, an historical background for understanding the second-price method of 
handling sealed bids in an auctioning forum is presented followed by a detailed discussion of 
how the second-price mechanism is applicable to sealed bid solicitations used in Government 
contracting. This chapter further explores how the SPSB method provides incentives for 
revealing actual (truthful) costs from contractors and provide the advantages for its use. 
In Chapter III, behavioral experimentation on the SPSB mechanism and the analysis of 
results is presented. This chapter describes the methodology and conditions in which the 
experiment was conducted. Analysis is then offered followed by discussion that examines the 
SPSB method as it applies to Government contracting. 
In Chapter IV, survey results are analyzed and discussed in detail. This chapter presents 
a listing of survey questions asked and provide analysis and discussion on the responses offered. 
This area of research focuses on those perceptions offered from Government and private industry 
regarding the applicability/non-applicability of the SPSB method in Government contracting. 
In Chapter V, conclusions and recommendations are provided. This chapter addresses 
each of the primary and subsidiary questions posed in Chapter I, and provides concluding 
remarks addressing whether the SPSB method is recommended for use in Government 
contracting. Additionally, suggest areas for further research are also listed in this chapter. 
F. DEFINITIONS 
Contractor (bidder) - As used throughout this thesis, contractor (bidder) refers to a 
prospective contractor from private industry that is considered a responsive and responsible 
source, where 1) a responsive source refers to an offeror having the ability to adhere to the 
specifications, quantities to be delivered, schedule, and numerous terms and conditions found in 
the contract and, 2) a responsible source, in accordance with section 2731(8) of the Competition 
in Contracting Act (CICA) of 1984 (Public Law 98-369), describes a contractor that, 
• has adequate financial resources to perform the contract or the ability to obtain such 
resources; 
• is able to comply with the required or proposed delivery or performance schedule, 
taking into consideration all existing commercial and Government business 
commitments; 
• has a satisfactory performance record; 
• has a satisfactory record of integrity and business ethics; 
• has the necessary organization, experience, accounting and operations controls, and 
technical skills, or the ability to obtain such organization, experience, controls, and 
skills; 
• has the necessary production, construction, or technical equipment and facilities; and 
• is otherwise qualified and eligible to receive an award under applicable laws and 
regulations. [Ref. 3, p. 247] 
Firm-Fixed Price (FFP) type contract - As the name implies, the FFP type contract 
represents an agreement by the contractor to furnish designated supplies or services at a specified 
price which is not subject to adjustment in light of performance or costs. In its basic form, the 
FFP contract carries the greatest risk to the contractor and offers the greatest possibility of profit 
or loss of any type contract, since the contractor cannot collect more than the agreed fixed price 
but is entitled to receive the full amount of the fixed price, regardless of the actual cost of 
performing the contract. This type of contract is preferred whenever a sound estimate of the cost 
of performing a contract can be made. Since it is fundamentally a simple exchange of a specified 
sum of money for a specified item, it is the easiest and least costly of all types of contracts to 
administer. [Ref. 4, p. 100] 
Price analysis - Price analysis is defined as the examination of a contractor's price 
proposal (bid) by comparison with "reasonable price benchmarks, without examination and 
evaluation of the separate elements of cost and profit making up the price." In conducting price 
analysis, four methods are available: (1) analysis of competitive price proposals; (2) comparison 
with catalog or market prices; (3) comparison with historical prices; and (4) use of independent 
cost estimates. [Ref. 5, p. 253] 
n. BACKGROUND 
It is easily shown that the required procedure is to ask for bids on the 
understanding that the award will be made to the highest bidder, but on the basis 
the price set by the second highest bidder. If this procedure is carried out, then 
the optimal strategy for each bidder (assuming the absence of collusion among 
bidders) will obviously be to make his bid equal to the full value of the article or 
contract to himself, i.e., to the highest amount he could afford to pay without 
incurring a net loss or to that price at which he would be on the margin of 
indifference as to whether he obtains the article or not. Bidding less than this 
full value could then only diminish his chances of winning at what would have 
been profitable, or at least not unprofitable, price and could not, collusion aside, 
affect the price he would actually pay if he were the successful bidder. Bidding 
more than full value, on the other hand, would increase his chances of winning, 
but only under circumstances that would involve him in an unprofitable 
transaction, the price to be paid being greater than his value. [Ref. 2, pp. 20-21] 
With this statement, the economist William Vickery introduced "second-pricing." 
Although first introduced in 1961, the second-pricing theory is, for the most part, unknown 
throughout Government and private industry. Extrapolating from the second-pricing theory, this 
thesis develops the Second Price Sealed Bid (SPSB) method. This chapter 1) gives an historical 
sketch of auctioning and sealed bidding, 2) describes how sealed bidding is applied in 
Government contracting, and 3) provides an analytical presentation of the SPSB method and 
mechanisms that provide advantages for its application. 
A. THE HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE OF AUCTIONING 
Organized auctioning, from which sealed bidding evolved, found its early roots in the 
annual Babylonian marriage market where men sought to bid "no small sum" for the "loveliest 
maidens." Auctions were used to dispose of mine concessions in ancient Greece and were 
routinely used in Roman times to raise funds by selling confiscated property. As such, 
auctioning was the earliest of mechanisms used by governments to dispose of surplus property. 
The word "Auction" is a derivative of three Latin words "auctio," "encan," and "subasta" which 
are defined as "an increase," "I cry," and "under spear," respectfully. "Roman soldiers would 
auction off surplus spoils of war on the battlefield by driving a spear into the ground and selling 
off the booty gathered round it to the highest bidder." In 10 A.D., the Roman Government 
auctioned rights to its state revenues to the highest bidder which relieved the Government from 
collecting. During this time it was also customary for debtors' property to be confiscated and 
sold at auction. [Ref. 6, pp. 39-41] 
Following the fall of the Roman Empire and before the seventeenth century, few auctions 
were held because of the "small size of the population and the small quantity of circulating 
coinage." Although auctioning was not well accepted in the Orient, its use rapidly grew with the 
economic development in the West. 
Auctions, as a method of selling, have only appeared in the comparatively 
civilized societies after the necessary conditions for their existence were fulfilled: 
an adequate concentration of the population to provide the sufficient number of 
buyers and sellers, and a coinage so that values of bids could be determined 
quickly. Thus, before the seventeenth century there were few regularly 
scheduled auctions sales. [Ref. 6, pp. 38-39] 
The beginning of the seventeenth century saw the introduction of the four basic methods 
in auctioning: auctions using a hammer (the method that is commonly used in modern times), the 
hourglass, the candle, and the Dutch auction. Both hourglass and candle auctions allowed 
bidders a limited time for bidding and required an acute skill in timing as reflected by Peys in his 
diary dated 6 November 1660: 
To our office, where we all met, for the sale of two ships by an ince of candle 
(the first time that I ever saw any of this kind), where I observed how they do 
invite one another, and at last how they all do cry, and we have much to do to 
tell who did cry last. The ships were the Indian, sold for L1300, and the 
Halfrnoon. sold for L830. After dinner we met and sold the Wevmouth. Success. 
and Fellowship hulks; where pleasant to see how backward men are first to bid, 
and yet when the candle is going out, how they bawl and dispute afterwards who 
bid the most first. And here I observed one man cunninger than the rest, that 
was sure to bid the last man, and to carry it; and enquiring the reason, he told me 
that, just as the flame goes out, the smoke descends, which is a thing I never 
observed before, and by that he do know the instant when to bid last. [Ref. 6, p. 
46] 
As the popularity of auctions grew, so did a bad reputation for dishonest practices which 
ushered in the Select Societies of Auctioneers in 1799. Established in England, the Society was 
formed to institute an honorable means of auctioning by providing training that made the practice 
a respectable occupation. As of 1983, the Select Society of Auctioneers still existed, however, in 
token form only. Since the 1800s, institutions such as the Auctioneers' and Estates Agents 
Institute of the United Kingdom and the French Auction Centre Hotel Drouot began to flourish. 
In the United States organized auctioning became widely accepted. In the 1960s, for example, 
there existed between 20,000 and 35,000 auctioneers and approximately 1900 wholesale auctions 
selling around $3.4 billion per year. [Ref. 6, pp. 46-50] 
As a variant of the auction, sealed bidding was believed to have its origins at a 
considerably later date than the first auctioning used during the Babylonian period. [Ref. 7, p. 35] 
With the growth in Federal and State Government, sealed bidding became widely accepted in the 
acquisition of large items such as transformers, steam turbines, ships, aircraft, and tanks. 
Currently, the Government, and especially DoD, routinely uses sealed bidding in the acquisition 
of everything from pencils to major weapon systems. [Ref. 6, p. 50] 
B. SEALED BIDDING AND GOVERNMENT CONTRACTING 
Similar to an auction, sealed bidding, as used in the contracting arena, is a technique of 
price-directed sourcing where award of a contract is based primarily on the lowest bid price 
offered. Both auction bidding and sealed bidding offer the capability for bidding in an open 
(public) forum which provide interested contractors the opportunity to compete equally for a 
contract. To ensure fairness and equality, "house" rules are provided that govern bid acceptance. 
The two bidding methods differ in that sealed bidding is believed to generate bid prices that 
reflect the reasonable cost of performance while auctioning generates bid prices that reflect 
current subjective values (vice cost). Additionally, "sealed bidding allows only one bid, whereas 
with auction bidding, repetitive competitive bids are sought." [Ref. 3, p.238] Evolving through 
years of political and legal debate, sealed bidding has become a preferred method of procurement 
in Government contracting. Consequently, sealed bidding has become widely accepted in 
contracting for services and materials where price is the primary criteria in determining award of 
a contract. [Ref. 6, pp. 49-50] 
As documented by Stanley N. Sherman, the criteria for considering and using sealed 
bidding in Government procurement includes the following: 
1. There will be more than one qualified supplier willing to compete for and to 
perform the proposed contract. 
2. The requirement is adequately defined to allow competitors to bid for the 
procurement on an equal basis. 
3. Sufficient time is available to allow the purchase to be accomplished through 
an orderly solicitation and award process. 
4. Price can be used as an adequate basis for determining the source to be 
awarded the contract. [Ref. 3, p. 241] 
Accordingly, sealed bidding in Government contracting is rigidly structured, where each 
step in the process is carefully executed to ensure equitable treatment of bidders while allowing 
the Government to make an award in a consistent and logical manner. Additionally, when 
applied by the Government, the Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) requires that, "only firm- 
fixed type contracts shall be used when the method of contracting is sealed bidding..." [Ref. 
8, p. 14-1] 
As further delineated in FAR Part 14. there are five basic steps in sealed bidding: 
(a) Preparation of invitation for bids. Invitations must describe the 
requirements of the Government clearly, accurately, and completely. 
Unnecessary restrictive specifications or requirements that might unduly limit 
the number of bidders are prohibited... 
(b) Publicizing the invitation for bids. Invitations must be publicized through 
distribution of prospective bidders, posting in public places, and such other 
means as may be appropriate. Publicizing must occur a sufficient time before 
public opening of bids to enable prospective bidders to prepare and submit bids. 
(c) Submission of bids. Bidders must submit sealed bids to be opened at the 
time and place stated in the solicitation for the public opening of bids. 
(d) Evaluation of bids. Bids shall be evaluated without discussion [with 
bidders]. 
(e) Contract award. After bids are publicly opened, an award will be made with 
a reasonable promptness to that bidder whose bid, conforming to the invitation 
for bids, will be most advantageous to the Government, considering only price 
and price-related factors included in the invitation. [Ref. 8, p. 14-1] 
In summary, after a requirement is generated and all the elements necessary in sealed 
bidding are present (i.e., the four criteria cited above by Sherman), then, 
1. a sealed bid solicitation for an FFP type contract is prepared and publicly announced 
through various methods (i.e., displaying in public places, mailing or delivery to 
prospective contractors, or advertising in newspapers, trade journals or Government 
publications such as the Commerce Business Daily), 
2. bids are prepared and received from prospective contractors and held, unopened, by 
the Government, 
10 
3. bids are then opened by Government officials in a public forum at an appointed time 
as specified in the solicitation for bid (at this time all contractors and their respective 
bids are publicly known), 
4. and award is made to the responsible contractor whose bid is considered most 
advantageous to the Government (i.e., the contractor that reflects the lowest price and 
can accomplish the requirements of the solicitation is awarded the contract). 
The only variation to the steps described above involves the two-step sealed bidding 
method. This method is used when technical clarification is required to refine specifications 
contained in the solicitation. This two-step procedure is described as follows: 
(a) Step one consists of the request for, submission, evaluation, and (if 
necessary) discussion of a technical proposal. No pricing is involved. The 
objective is to determine the acceptability of the supplies or services offered... 
Conformity to technical requirements is resolved in this step... 
(b) Step two involves the submission of sealed price bids by those who 
submitted acceptable technical proposals in step one. Bids submitted in step two 
are evaluated and the awards made... [Ref. 8, p. 14-20] 
Accordingly, sealed bidding in Government contracting is a very formal process that 
employs competition in a public forum that ultimately results in award being made equitably to 
the lowest bid submitted that is most advantageous to the Government. This thesis will now 
explore the theory of the SPSB method. 
C. THE BASIC THEORY OF THE SPSB METHOD 
For any given requirement, the buyer, i.e., the Government, wants a method of bidding 
that maximizes its utility while minimizing associated expenditures. The Government's desired 
utilities for a contracted item may be characterized as being the fastest, highest, smallest, most 
efficient, most powerful, and so forth. Expenditures, on the other hand, are those resources 
consumed in the process of attaining these desired utilities. Such resources would, for example, 
include dollars, manpower, and materials. Obtaining the above utilities while minimizing 
expenditures is the underlying theme from which this thesis is drafted. More specifically, a 
bidding method that meets the Government's requirements (utilities) while minimizing 
expenditures is desired. Therefore, this thesis turns its attention to the SPSB method to 
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understand its theoretical implications as it pertains to minimizing resource expenditures in the 
acquisition process. 
Extrapolating from the second-pricing theory provided by Mr. Edi Kami (John Hopkins 
University) and Mr. Zvi Safra (Tel-Aviv University) this thesis proposes the following SPSB 
theory. [Ref. 9, pp. 420-433] When considering the SPSB method, it is assumed that competing 
contractors want to maximize their chances of winning profitable contracts. Given any contract, 
let bp and tc denote, respectively, the bid price and the true cost associated in performing the 
contract.4 And further suppose that a contractor's bp < tc. Clearly, if the lowest bid of the other 
contractors is less than bp then the given contractor loses whether he bids bp or tc. If the lowest 
bid of the other contractors is greater than tc, then he wins whether he bids bp or tc. Thus, 
bidding a price lower than tc makes a difference only of the lowest bid of the other contractors is 
between bp and tc. However, in this case the contractor wins the contract for a price that is less 
than his true cost, which is not optimal. Thus, bp must not be less than tc. Bidding a price, bp, 
higher than tc is similarly not optimal. For if other contractors bid lower than bp, yet higher than 
tc, the contractor losses the award and earns nothing. Consequently, regardless of the behavior of 
the other contractors, bidding a contractor's true cost constitutes the dominant strategy in the 
SPSB method. 
To provide a less sophisticated theoretical description of the SPSB method, the following 
contract bidding scenarios describe how alternative pricing strategies generate the dominant, or 
optimal, SPSB pricing strategy for contractors. As shown below, Table 1 represents a bid 
schedule where, 
• Contractor represents interested contractors bidding in response to a SPSB solicitation 
for a Government FFP type contract for products or services. 
• Bid Amount represents the corresponding contractor's bid price for the solicited 
contract. 
4
 To extrapolate from William Vickerey's second-pricing theory, the true cost, tc, represents a bidder's 
total cost to perform a contract, which includes a bidder's margin of profit that is normally determined 
through a corporate profit policy. Additionally, included in tc is a contractor's opportunity cost of profit 
(e.g., a bidder may bid below tc, thereby foregoing profit to increase the chance of winning an award). 
[Ref. 2, p. 20] 
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> True Cost (Actual Cost) represents the corresponding contractor's actual anticipated 
cost to perform a contract. As such, true cost is a total cost which includes all direct 
and indirect costs (as well as the margin of profit, or cost of profit, as suggested by 
William Vickerey). [Ref. 2, p.20] 
Contractor Bid Amount Actual Cost 
A $25,500 $25,000 
B $26,000 $24,000 
c $27,000 $26,000 
Table 1. Bid schedule. 
In the above table, Contractors A, B, and C are competing for a Government contract where, for 
example, Contractor C has submitted a bid price of $27,000 with a corresponding true cost to 
perform the contract of $26,000. 
In applying the First Price Sealed Bid (FPSB) method to the Bid schedule in Table 1, the 
contractor having the lowest bid price wins the award and is paid their corresponding bid price. 
Therefore, Contractor A would win the award and be paid $25,500. The profit earnings in this 
scenario would be: 
Profit = FPSB award price (Contractor A's bid price) - Contractor A's true cost 
= $25,500 - 25,000 
= $500 
When we consider applying the SPSB method, the contractor submitting the lowest bid 
price wins the award, however, in contrast to the FPSB method, is paid the next lowest bid price. 
Referring to Table 1, Contractor A would win the award and be paid the next lowest bid price of 
$26,000 which was submitted by Contractor B. In this case, Contractor A would realize a profit 
of $1,000 which is calculated below: 
Profit = SPSB award price (Contractor B's bid price) - Contractor A's true cost 
= $26,000 - 25,000 
= $1,000 
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1. Bid Price Equals True Cost 
Under the SPSB method, a contractor's best pricing strategy for winning an award is to 
submit the lowest possible bid price in the competition that will also return a profit. However, 
determining where the best bid price should be set becomes a dilemma. For example, in setting a 
bid price below a contractor's true cost increases the chance of winning the award, however, 
concurrently increases the chance of winning the award in an unprofitable position. Conversely, 
setting a bid price higher than true cost increases the chance of losing the award to a competitor. 
In addressing this dilemma in further detail, consider Table 2. 
Contractor Bid Amount Actual Cost 
A $25,000 $25,000 
B $24,000 $24,000 
C $26,000 $26,000 
Table 2. Bid price equals true cost. 
In this table it is assumed that all contractors behave rationally. As such, each contractor 
assumes their most competitive position by setting their bid price equal to their true cost. As a 
rational contractor, they know that winning the award under this scenario will guarantee a profit 
equal to the difference between the next lowest bid price and their true cost. Invoking the SPSB 
method to the scenario presented in Table 2, Contractor B would be awarded the contract and be 
paid the next lowest bid price as set by Contractor A. Contractor B's profit would be calculated 
as follows: 
Profit = SPSB award price (Contractor A's bid price) - Contractor B's true cost 
= $25,000 - 24,000 
= $1,000 
In contrast to the SPSB award scenario described in Table 1 , award in Table 2 went to 
the most cost efficient contractor (i.e., award was given to the contractor who could perform the 
contract at the least cost; Contractor B's true cost < Contractor A's true cost => Contractor B is 
5
   You may recall that the contractors' bid prices reflected in Table 1 were all higher than their 
respective true costs (i.e., bp > ac)). 
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considered more cost efficient). Therefore, where rational contractors submit a bid price 
equal to their true cost, then contract award goes to the most cost efficient contractor. 
2. Bid Price Above True Cost 
Suppose, as shown in table 3, that Contractor B bids higher than his true cost. 
Contractor Bid Amount Actual Cost 
A $25,000 $2b,000 
B $26,000 $24,000 
C $26,000 $26,000 
Table 3. Bid price above true cost. 
Accordingly, Contractor B losses award to the lowest bid price offered by Contractor A. 
Had Contractor B bid his true cost, he would have been awarded the contract and is paid $1,000 
profit. However, in the scenario above, he has earned nothing. 
Given this scenario, one can then say that as a contractor incrementally raises his bid 
price above his true cost, he unnecessarily increases the risk of losing an award to a competitor. 
As applied to Table 3, Contractor B has acted irrationally and gained nothing by raising his bid 
price above his true cost. Hence: 
Under the SPSB method, contractors bidding higher than their true cost act 
irrationally because they increase the risk of losing an award, thereby 
diminishing the chance of earning any sum of profit. 
3. Bid Price Below True Cost 
Now consider the case where Contractor B's bid price is lower than his true cost in hopes 
of increasing the chance of winning the award. This is reflected in Table 4 below. 
Contractor Bid Amount Actual Cost 
A $2b,000 $25,000 
B $23,000 $24,000 
C $26,000 $26,000 
Table 4. Bid price below true cost. 
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Under this scenario, Contractor B would have won award and earned $1,000 profit as calculated 
below: 
Profit = SPSB award price (Contractor A's bid price) - Contractor B's true cost 
= $25,000 - 24,000 
= $1,000 
In this situation, Contractor A may believe he can improve the chances of winning the award by 
offering a bid price far below his true cost and still realize a $1,000 profit. In fact, Contractor A 
would realize this profit if he were to bid one dollar. However, if another contractor offers a bid 
price below Contractor B's true cost, then Contractor B would win the award in an unprofitable 












Table 5. Bid below true cost. 
In accordance with the SPSB method, Contractor B would win the award and be paid a 
price of $23,000 (Contractor C's bid price), which is below his true cost of $24,000. 
Accordingly, his loss would be calculated as follows: 
Loss = SPSB award price (Contractor C's bid price) - Contractor B's true cost 
= $23,000 - 24,000 
= -$1,000 
In this case it is shown that bidding below one's true cost is irrational. Given this scenario, one 
can conclude that as a contractor incrementally lowers his bid price below his true cost, he 
concurrently increases the risk of winning the award in an unprofitable position. Hence, 
Under the SPSB method, contractors bidding lower than their true cost act 
irrationally because they increase the chance of winning an award in an 
unprofitable position. 
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4. The Case Where Lowest Bid Prices are Equal 
The final scenario addresses the case where Contractor A's bid price is the lowest, 
however, is equal to another bidder's price. This is shown in Table 6. 
Contractor Bid Amount Actual Cost 
A $25,000 $25,000 
B $25,000 $25,000 
C $27,000 $26,000 
Table 6. Lowest bid is equal between competitors. 
Accordingly, Contractors A and B show a bid price of $25,000 which represents the lowest bid 
price. Under these circumstances we must determine who wins the award and at what bid price 
is the awardee paid. Ideally, tie-breaking provisions in the solicitation would address this 
situation. One suggested alternative is splitting the contract between the lowest bidders and 
paying both one-half of the next lowest bid price. This situation will be further analyzed and 
discussed in Chapters III and IV. 
5. A Summary oftheSPSB Method 
To summarize the above findings, it is shown that rational contractors are incentivized to 
set their bid price equal to their true cost. Bidding in this manner maximizes their opportunity to 
win an award in a profitable position. Acting irrationally, on the other hand, contractors will set 
their bid price above or below their true cost which only serves to diminish a contractor's chance 
of earning a sum of profit. 
D. THEORETICAL ADVANTAGES OF THE SPSB METHOD 
As described above, contractors' optimal pricing strategy when the SPSB method is 
applied is to bid their true cost. Theoretically then, advantages that result from this strategy 
would include the following: 
• Costly and time intensive Government administrative requirements (e.g., various 
administrative requirements involved in PALT) would be eliminated. As a prime 
example, by knowing what contractors' true costs are (where bid prices are set to true 
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costs), market surveys used in determining price reasonableness would become 
unnecessary. 
• The most cost efficient contractor will always win the award. The Government is 
assured that the contractor receiving the award exercises the most cost efficient 
practices relative to its competitors. 
• Contractors are incentivized to expedite implementation of cost efficient practices. The 
quicker a contractor can lower the cost of performance, the greater the profits that will 
be earned because the winning contractor will continue be paid the next lowest bid 
price. 
• Contractors are spared the additional time and expense necessary in compiling profit 
data necessary in developing a competitive bid price. Under the SPSB method, bid 
prices will always be set equal to the true costs. 
• Competition may be stimulated. The simplicity in bid price setting (i.e., setting bid 
price equal to true cost) may attract prospective contractors in engaging in business 
with the Government. 
In short, the founder of the second-pricing theory, Mr. William Vickery, made a 
statement regarding its advantages: 
It is one of the salient advantages of the second-price method that it makes any 
such general market appraisal entirely superfluous, whether considered from the 
standpoint of individual gain or from that of the over-all allocation of resources. 
Each bidder can confine his efforts and attention to an appraisal of the article 
[contract] would have in his own hands, at a considerable saving in mental strain 
and possibly out of pocket expense. In the first instance this saving might 
redound largely to the benefit of the bidders; as a corollary, however, more 
bidders might be induced to put in bids, resulting in a better allocation of 
resources... [Ref. 2, p. 22] 
Throughout the remainder of this thesis, this thesis analyzes the plausibility concerning 
these advantages and discusses their applicability in the "real world." 
E. SUMMARY 
Historically, this thesis has shown the emergence of auctioning and sealed bidding. 
Despite a bad reputation in the 1700s, they have become a mainstay in today's market place. In 
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the 1900s sealed bidding became popular in Government procurement. As such, a description 
was provided regarding the application of the sealed bidding method in Government contracting. 
As one forges into the 21st Century, innovative theories and methods, such as SPSB, are being 
introduced as tools to more efficiently allocate resources. Hence, this chapter provided the 
theory of the SPSB method and explained how the optimal pricing strategy is beneficial for both 
Government and private industry. Despite these advantages, its application within the 
Government contracting arena (and, for the most part, private industry) has neither been tested or 
applied. The following chapter presents the results of two SPSB experiments which will provide 
insight into the SPSB mechanisms. 
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HI. EXPERIMENTATION WITH THE FPSB/SPSB METHOD 
This chapter will, through two sets of experimentation, 1) highlight behavior changes 
that exist when shifting from the First Price Sealed Bid (FPSB) method to the Second Price 
Sealed Bid (SPSB) method as used in the context of Government contracting, and 2) identify 
pricing trends found in the second-price auctioning mechanism and apply these trends to the 
SPSB method. 
This chapter will begin by describing the methodology and conditions in which the first 
set of four independent SPSB experiments were conducted. The results of each experiment are 
then compared and analyzed. Then, a second set of experiments that reveal pricing trends used in 
the second-price auction mechanism is analyzed. From these trends, inferences regarding their 
application to the SPSB method are identified. The final section of this chapter will then provide 
concluding observations concerning behavioral changes and expected pricing trends as they 
pertain to the SPSB method. 
A. EXPERIMENTATION WITH THE FPSB AND SPSB METHODS 
1. The Setting for Experimentation 
To accomplish experimentation of the FPSB and SPSB methods, four independent 
classroom experiments which involved 102 graduate students were conducted.   Thirty-four 
groups were formed from the 102 students and each group represented a contractor competing for 
award of a Government FFP type contract. Each of the four experiments consisted of two 
phases. As reflected in Appendix C, Phase I of Experiment 1 requested each group to 1) provide 
a bid price for the manufacture often infrared sensors under the terms of the FPSB method, and 
2) provide a bid price for the manufacture often microprocessors under the terms of the SPSB 
method. In formulating their bid prices, each group was provided: 
• a unique "true" cost in manufacturing ten sensors , 
6
 All 102 graduate students were attending studies at the Navy Postgraduate School, Monterey, 
California. 
7
 "True" cost is defined as the actual total cost incurred by a contractor to manufacture an item. 
Accordingly, this would include all direct and indirect costs, less profit. 
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• the industry-wide average cost to manufacture ten sensors, 
• the industry-wide average profit rate of eight-percent. 
For example, in Phase 1 of Experiment 1 each of the eleven groups were provided a cost 
that was within the range of $900 to $1,100, informed that the industry-wide average cost to 
manufacture ten sensors was $1,000, and that the industry-wide profit rate was 8-percent. This is 
reflected in Table 7 below. 
Experiment 1, Phase I 
\lhdustry Average Cost =$1,000 
Industry Average Prom = 8% 
""-■^•ö^^f"-]jj^'""i"""'lsf %             2nd %  
Price    i Change :    Price    ; Change 
.„„.,. 
1 1,095 1,095 0.00% 1,095 0.00% 
---- 
2 907 9i>/ 5.51% 907 0.00% 
3 1,078 1,080 0.19% 1,020 -5.38% 
4 1,070 1,0/0 0.00% 1,070 0.00% 
5 1,091 1,178 7.97% 1,145 4.95% 
6 966 1,040 7.66% 1,010 4.55% 
7 1,036 1,000 2.32% 1,036 0.00% 
8 907 960 5.84% 940 3.64% 
9 1,043 1,075 3.07% 1,070 2.59% 
10 1,025 1,075 4.88% 1,074 4.78% 
11 947 1,004 6.00% 947 0.00% 
Table 7. Results from Experiment 1, Phases I. 
In determining "cost" values unique to each group, the Microsoft Excel Random Number 
Generator (Version 5.0) was applied which produced the distribution of costs found in the "Cost" 
column in Table 7.8 The formulation of these cost values were derived from a uniform- 
distribution having a plus/minus ten-percent factor from the mean-cost-value. Given the above 
information, each group was requested to formulate their bid price. 
8
   Appendix D provides a full listing of Microsoft Excel randomly generated "Cost" values assigned in 
Tables 7 through 11. 
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To provide additional clarification to Table 7, the columns "1st Price" and "2nd Price" 
refer to each groups' bid prices under the FPSB and SPSB methods, respectfully. The "% 
Change" column represents the percent difference between each groups' FPSB and SPSB price 
and their true cost. For example, Group 11 shows a six-percent FPSB price increase above their 
true cost and a zero-percent change between their SPSB price and their true cost. 
Similar to Phase I, Phase II requested each group to submit two bid prices to 
manufacture a complex microprocessor under the terms of the FPSB and SPSB method, 
respectfully. In formulating their bid prices, each group was provided: 
• a unique "true" cost in manufacturing ten microprocessors, 
• the industry-wide average profit rate of twelve-percent (vice eight-percent as used in 
Phase 1). 
Because the technology to manufacture the microprocessors was considered state-of-the-art, no 
industry-wide average cost was available. 
Prior to conducting each of the four experiments, all groups were provided a full 
description of the FPSB and SPSB methods. Accordingly, definitions were provided to each 
group as follows: 
• First Price Sealed Bid - Award goes to the lowest bidder and is paid the amount of 
their bid. 
• Second Price Sealed Bid - Award goes to the lowest bidder and is paid the amount of 
the next to lowest bid. 
To provide further clarification, each group was informed that 1) the economy was 
assumed to be steadily growing, 2) that "learning-curve" cost efficiencies did not pertain , 3) that 
each group had their own unique cost (i.e., that the chances of any two groups having the same 
cost is remote), and 3) each group must formulate their pricing strategies independently (i.e., 
there was to be no sharing of information between groups). 
9
  The "learning-curve" concept suggests that during the production life of an item, unit costs decrease 
due to improved production efficiencies. 
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2. Experiment 1 - A Shift from the FPSB Method to SPSB Method 
As shown in Appendix C, Phases I and II of Experiment 1 requested each of the eleven 
participating groups to provide a FPSB and SPSB price in response to a Government solicitation 
for ten infrared sensors (Phase I) and ten microprocessors (Phase II). The results are shown 
below in Table 8. 
TExpenmeniT/P'HäseT 
ilriaüsfry Average Cost =$T;D00 
■ Industry Average Profit =8% 








1 1,09b 1,09b 0.00% 1,095 0.00% 
2 90/ 957 5.51% 907 0.00% 
3 1,0/0 1.ÜÜ0 0.19% 1,020 -5.38% 
4 1,0/U 1,070 0.00% 1,0/0 0.00% 
5 1,091 1,1/0 /.9/% 1,14b 4.9t>% 
6 9ÖÖ 1,040 7.66% 1,010 4.bt>% 
7 1,030 1,060 2.32% 1,036 ü.uu% 
a 90/ 9ÖÜ 5.04% 94Ö 3.64% 
9 1,043 1,075 3.07% 1,070 2.69% 
10 1,02b 1,0/b 4.88% 1,074 4.78% 
11 94/ 1,004 6.00% 94/ 0.00% 
?SFSB'WTn^Tng''Biaffer'-'Gro'üp'''%Trofii{'='3l$', 
:Experiment 1, Phase II 
'irh^uäry'Äveräiäe"Cöst'='nöWe'prövläe'd'' 
trhäüst'ry Average Profit '= T2% ä  




 2nd  7o'  
Change 
1 9,bb/ 10,131 6.01% 9,bb/ 0.00% 
2 10,300 11,705 13.64% 10,300 0.00% 
3 8,658 9,524 10.00% 8,700 0.49% 
4 9,30b 10,235 9.99% 9,305 0.00% 
5 9,176 9,634 4.99% 9.B43 4.00% 
B 8,039 Ö.Ö40 9.96% 8,440 4.99% 
7 8,827 9,260 5.00% 0,02/ 0.00% 
8 10,602 11,662 10.00% 10,602 U.00% 
9 8,239 9,063 10.ÜU% 8,899 0.01% 
10 11,64b 13,302 15.00% 12,693 9.00% 
11 10,867 11,/36 8.00% 10.B6/ 0.00% 
TSPSB WinningBidder - Group 6, Profit = 661 
Table 8. Results from Experiment 1, Phases I & II. 
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a. Experiment 1, Phase I 
In Phase I the industry-wide average cost was $1,000 and the industry-wide 
profit rate was eight-percent. As reflected in Table 8, the predominant FPSB pricing strategy 
was to set bid prices between true cost and true cost-plus-eight-percent (the industry-wide profit 
rate). The rationale for this pricing strategy was to reflect a competitive bid price that was 
believed to be lower than the competition. Winning the award under this strategy, therefore, 
guaranteed some level of profit. 
In contrast to the above strategy, two groups did set their FPSB price equal to 
their true costs. Because these groups has true costs that exceeded the industry-wide average cost 
of $ 1,000, their strategy was to simply bid the lowest possible price that would "get their foot in 
the door" without losing money. Overall, the FPSB pricing strategies reflected in Table 8 are 
consistent with typical business pricing practices. 
When shifting to the SPSB method, there is an overall reduction in bid prices as 
compared to those reflected under the FPSB method. Of the eleven groups, five groups (Groups 
1, 2, 4, 7, and 11) chose to set their bid price equal to their true cost. This is reflected in the last 
column in Table 8 where the "% Change from Cost" equals "0.00%." The rationale for this 
pricing strategy included, "[We] bid our cost because if we're [the] lowest [bidder], we get paid 
at some profit level," "[If we bid at cost we're] guaranteed not to lose money," and "Since this is 
a second price solicitation, we thought that by bidding at cost we were assured of making some 
profit above our bid if we were selected." Accordingly, these groups acted rationally by correctly 
formulating the SPSB optimal pricing strategy discussed in Chapter II (i.e., to set one's bid price 
equal to their true cost). Group 3 chose to bid 5.38-percent below their true cost, believing that 
they would improve their chances of winning the contract. In choosing this strategy, Group 3 did 
increase the chance of winning the contract, however, they also increased their chance of 
winning in a loss position. 
The remaining groups chose to continue with their original FPSB strategy of 
bidding above their true cost, yet lower than their cost-plus-eight-percent (the industry-wide 
profit rate). Under this strategy, they were guaranteed a profit if they won the award. 
In analyzing the winning bidder, Group 2, it should be noted that applying the 
SPSB method resulted in choosing the most cost efficient group. This concurs with the 
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theoretical advantage of the SPSB method stated in Chapter II where the most cost efficient 
contractor is awarded a contract when the SPSB method is applied. Although the winning bidder 
maintained the optimal pricing strategy of bidding their true cost, this strategy was not as 
successful in winning awards in future experiments. 
It is also interesting to note that both Groups 2 and 8 had an identical cost 
structure (i.e., both their true costs were $907). If Group 8 would have bid their true 
cost, then there would have been a tie for the winning lowest bid. Had this occurred, a 
possible solution which was previously offered in Chapter II would have been to split the 
award equally, and pay each winner one-half of the next lowest bid price. In the above 
experiment, this would have resulted in Groups 2 and 8 being awarded a contract to 
produce five sensors each and paid one-half of the next lowest bid price of $947 (Group 
11 's bid price). An alternative option would be to award the entire contract by means of 
a toss-of-the-coin or a draw. In this instance the winning group is chosen by the flip-of- 
a-coin or picking a "win" or "lose" card. The winning group is then awarded the entire 
contract. This situation will be discussed in further detail in this thesis. 
b. Experiment 1, Phase II 
In Phase II of Table 8, the industry-wide profit rate is twelve-percent, and, in 
contrast to Phase I, there is no industry-wide average cost. In selecting a FPSB pricing strategy, 
ten of the eleven groups all set bid prices between their true cost and true cost-plus-twelve- 
percent profit (where twelve-percent represents the industry-wide average profit rate). In 
remaining consistent with the general strategy reflected in Phase I, their FPSB pricing strategy 
was to lessen their profit below the industry-wide profit rate in order to submit a more 
competitive bid. The only exception, Group 10, set their bid price at cost-plus-fifteen-percent 
profit and stated the following rationale, "Since we're state-of-the-art (cutting edge) we should be 
able to get a [15]% profit." Unfortunately, this group totally disregarded the pricing strategies 
exercised by their competitors. 
Similar to the results found in Phase I, introducing the SPSB method in Phase II 
was accompanied by dramatically reduced bid prices as compared to those bid prices found 
under the FPSB method. In fact, six of the eleven groups are reflecting the optimal pricing 
strategy by setting their bid prices equal to their true cost. The rationale for bidding in this 
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manner included, "Bid at cost with the knowledge that if we won the award at the next [lowest] 
price would ensure some profit" and "We're going to get the contract and still make a profit if 
[the] second to lowest bid is above our cost." The essence of these comments is in agreement 
with the SPSB optimal pricing theory that bidding at true cost maximizes the chances of each 
groups' opportunity to win an award in a profitable position. 
As with Phase I, the remaining groups reflected bid prices above their true costs. 
Accordingly, they followed their same pricing strategy used under the FPSB method. Of note, in 
both Phases of Experiment 1 there was no cited reasoning as to why their SPSB prices were 
lower than their FPSB prices. It can only be speculated that the SPSB method was believed 
intensify competition, thereby causing each group to reflect bid prices that were perceived to be 
more competitive. 
In contrast to the winning bidder in Phase I, the winning bidder in Phase II, 
Group 6, did not bid their true cost. Coincidentally, however, this group was also the most cost 
efficient group in Phase II. Consequently, Group 6 could have set their bid price equal to their 
true cost, or a price slightly below the next lowest bidder and still won the award. In short, one 
can conclude from Phase II that with the unavoidable element of uncertainty, luck will prevail in 
isolated instances where the winning bidder does not practice the optimal, or dominant, bidding 
strategy of setting their bid price equal their true cost. 
3. Experiment 2 - A Shift from the FPSB Method to SPSB Method 
As shown in Appendix C, Phases I and II of Experiment 2 requested each of the nine 
participating groups to provide a FPSB and a SPSB price in response to a Government 
solicitation for ten infrared sensors (Phase I) and ten microprocessors (Phase II). The results are 
shown below in Table 9. (Note that Group 2 of Phase 2 was eliminated because they falsely 
applied a learning-curve effect in determining their bid price.) 
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\ExperimeM2,Phasei 
Industry AverageCost = $10,000 
Industry Average Profit = 8% 
Group;     Cost            %       l   Profit 
Change         % 
2nd 
Price 
 %  
Change 
  
1 10./33 10,/9b 0.58% 10,700 -0.31% 
2 10,390 10,400 0.02% 10,200 -1.90% 
3 S.büü 10,150 6.84% 10,059 5.88% 
4 10,498 12,000 14.31% 10,500 0.02% 
5 10,813 11,000 1.73% 11,000 1.73% 
6 9,081 9,175 1.04% 9,08* 0.00% 
7 9,057 9,600 6.00% 9,510 5.00% 
8 10,091 10./9Ö 7.02% 10,400 3.067o 
9 10,449 10,649 1.91% 10,400 -0.47% 
  
SPSB Winning Bidder-Group 6, Profit = 429 
(Experiment 2, Phase II 
|rh'duäi^"Äveifage"Co^'='nbne"'p>bvic ed  
  
Industry Average Profit = 12% 
'Group: Cost T %' ; Profit"" 
!"C'ha"rige"i %  
2nd 
Price 
 %  
Change 
1 3,659 3,9b2 8.01% 3,879 6.01% 
2 - - - - - 
3 5,916 6,500 9.87% 6,450 9.037b 
4 3,733 4,0/0 9.03% 4,000 7.157o 
5 3,450 3,450 0.00% 3,491 1.01% 
6 5,293 5,399 2.00% 5,293 0.007o 
7 3,150 3,465 10.00% 3,402 8.00% 
8 4,82/ 5,310 10.01% 5,068 4.997o 
9 4,42b 4,82b 9.04% 4,690 5.997o 
SPSB Winning Bidder, GroupT, Pro Fit = 34i 
Table 9. Results from Experiment 2, Phases I & II. 
a. Experiment 2, Phase I 
In Phase 1 the industry-wide average cost was $10,000 and the industry-wide 
profit rate was eight-percent. With one exception, the FPSB pricing strategy for each group was 
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to set bid prices between true costs and true cost-plus-eight-percent (where eight-percent is the 
industry-wide profit rate). In considering the industry-wide average cost of $10,000, four of the 
nine groups having true costs above this amount were willing to earn below a two-percent profit 
in order to submit competitive bid prices. Despite having a true cost figure above the industry- 
wide average, Group 4 set their bid at 6.31-percentage points above the industry-wide profit rate. 
"[We] make money by taking risk...their [the competition's] cost might be higher than ours." 
Despite having a cost higher than the industry-wide average cost, they grossly erred in believing 
that the competition's costs were higher than theirs. 
When applying the SPSB method, it is noted that the same phenomena as 
experienced in Experiment 1 where there was an overall downward pricing trend when shifting 
from the FPSB method to the SPSB method. In Phase I of Experiment 2, however, three of the 
groups chose to set their bid prices slightly below their true costs. In setting their bid prices in 
this manner, they hoped "to get [be awarded] someone else's price to make a profit." The 
strategy observed here is to set the bid price slightly below one's true cost and chancing that the 
next lowest bid price is above this amount. Although this strategy increases the chance of 
winning the award, groups acting in this manner must acknowledge an opportunity trade-off. In 
assuming this type of risk, these groups should be willing to operate at a loss if awarded the 
contract and paid a next lowest bid price below their true cost. Furthermore, a group's long-term 
strategy may include such a short-term buy-in tactic (i.e., bidding a price below one's true cost to 
win award in hopes of follow-on profitable contracts). This is a commonly practiced pricing 
strategy used in real-world scenarios and is practiced when contractors are attempting to "get 
their foot into the door" in hopes of attracting future contracts with the Government. Contractors 
will also submit a buy-in bid price as a means of company survival. In either case, contractors 
are willing to operate at a loss in the short-term to improve their cash flow, thereby chancing that 
future opportunities will compensate their short-term losses. Obviously, this is a risky endeavor 
that must carefully be analyzed with respect to a contractor's capability to perform. 
In setting a bid price slightly below one's true cost, however, may prove to be a 
variant optimal bidding strategy when the level of such under-bidding is less than the prospective 
cost differentials between the two lowest bidders. In this scenario, however, this will not change 
who will become the winning bidder. The lowest cost producer will always win the award 
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among the experienced (knowledgeable) bidders. In addition, if the level of under-bidding is 
equal to the cost differential between the two lowest bidders, then the nature of the tie-breaking 
provision becomes important. For example, if the provision entails awarding the next lowest 
price (i.e., the third lowest price) rather than the tied lowest bid price, then under-bidding will be 
the optimal strategy. Conversely, if the tie-breaking provision calls for awarding the tied lowest 
bid price, then the dominate strategy is to bid one's true cost. To the extent the subjects of these 
experiments view the cost differentials to be greater than a penny, it is not surprising to see them 
bidding a penny lower (i.e., the smallest denomination of currency) than their true cost. 
Group 4's bid of $10,500, which is only two dollars above than their true cost, 
represents a near-optimal pricing strategy. Although they cited that this bid price "just covers 
total cost, but still makes money," their strategy would have been flawed had another group bid 
$10,499. If this would have happened, group four would have certainly lost the award. In fact, a 
similar situation is represented by the bid prices provided by Groups 6 and 7. Notice that Group 
7 has the lowest true cost of $9,057, but bid a price of $9,510. On the other hand, Group 6's bid 
price of $9,081 was equal to their true cost, which resulted in winning the award. In accordance 
with the SPSB payment schedule, they were paid $9,510 which was, coincidentally, Group 7's 
bid price. Had Group 7 bid a price equal to their true cost, they would have won the award. 
Bidding above their true cost resulted in losing the award. Therefore, the theory of bidding 
above one's true cost is irrational as earlier stated in Chapter II: 
Under the SPSB method, contractors bidding higher than their true cost act 
irrationally because they increase the risk of losing an award, thereby 
diminishing the chance of earning any sum of profit. 
The remaining three groups, Groups 3, 5, 7, and 8, continued with their original 
FPSB pricing strategy of setting SPSB prices between their true costs and true cost-plus-the- 
industry- wide profit rate. 
b. Experiment 2, Phase II 
Identical to Phase II of Experiment 1, the industry-wide profit rate in Phase II of 
Experiment 2 was twelve-percent and no industry-wide average cost was provided. As observed 
in the three previous phases, bid prices offered under the SPSB method were, with few 
exceptions, consistently lower than bid prices offered under the FPSB method. In observing one 
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of the exceptions, Group 5's bid price actually increased when shifting from the FPSB method to 
the SPSB method. Accordingly, under the FPSB method, they set their FPSB price equal to 
their true cost and subsequently raised their price (above their true cost) when competing under 
the terms of the SPSB method. As stated in their rationale, Group 5 set their SPSB price at 
$3,491 "to make a small profit and win the award." This is a questionable strategy because they 
would have improved their chances of winning the award and still made a "small profit" if their 
bid remained equal to their true cost. 
In Phase 2, Group 7's bid price, which reflected a profit rate of eight-percent, 
won the SPSB award. It is interesting to note that this group was also the most cost efficient 
group in the competition and would have won the competition and earned the same profit if their 
bid price was set equal to their true cost. Therefore, bidding higher than their true cost to earn 
higher profits unnecessarily increased their risk of losing the competition. 
In both phases of Experiment 2, bidding above one's cost under the SPSB 
method decreased the chance of winning a competition. Furthermore, bidding higher did not 
improve or increase a groups opportunity for earning additional profit. In Phase 1 the most cost 
efficient group that bid higher than their true cost lost the competition (thereby earning nothing) 
and, similarly, in Phase 2 the winning group who set their bid price higher than their true cost did 
not improve their chances of earning additional profits. One can conclude, therefore, that 
bidding higher than one's true cost is irrational under the SPSB method. 
4. Experiment 3 - A Shift from the FPSB Method to SPSB Method 
As provided in Appendix C, Phases I and II of Experiment 3 requested each of the five 
participating groups to provide a FPSB and SPSB price in response to a Government solicitation 
for ten infrared sensors (Phase I) and ten microprocessors (Phase II). The results are shown 
below in Table 10. 
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\Experimehi3,Phäsei 
 |ln"tfüstify'Average'Coä''=''$'f,'000  
Industry AverageProfit = 8% 
2nd 
P rice 
Group i    Cöst           1st             %  %  
Price    i Change Change 
1 906 91b 0.99% 914 0.88% 
2 1,030 1,112 7.96% 1,102 6.99% 
3 910 983 8.02% 910 0.00% 
4 1,055 1,119 5.97% 1,056 0.00% 
5 1,01b 1,035 1.97% 1,056 4.04% 
\Experimehi3, Phase II 








 %  
i   Price Change 
  
1 9,425 9,528 1.09% 9,519 1.00% 
2 9,413 10,542 11.99% 10,448 11.00% 
3 11,9bö 13,753 15.01% 11,958 0.00% 
4 8,021 8,823 10.00% 8,021 0.00% 
5 11,484 11,829 3.00% 12,173 6.00% 
■öfit = T,49 SPSB Winning 6 fading - Group 4, Pi 8 
Table 10. Results from Experiment 3, Phases I & II. 
a. Experiment 3, Phase I 
In Phase I the most cost efficient group, Group 1, set their SPSB price above 
their true cost which resulted in losing the award. (One may recall that this situation was 
duplicated in Phase 1 of Experiment 2.) If Group 1 were to bid according to the optimal pricing 
theory under the SPSB method, they would have bid their true cost of $906 and won the award. 
Group 3, on the other hand, bid their true cost of $910 and won the award. Although Group l's 
bid price was only slightly above their true cost, it proved unprofitable. Once again, this shows 
that setting one's bid price slightly above one's true cost is irrational. 
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Although Group 4 lost the award, they chose to set their bid price equal to their 
true cost. In doing so, they succinctly described the optimal pricing strategy as follows: 
[Our] rationale is that our bid would just cover our cost. If we are the low bid, 
we will be awarded the contract and will be paid the next higher bid amount. 
That next higher bid will determine our profit. 
b. Experiment 3, Phase II 
In this phase Group 4 continued to practice bidding according to the optimal 
SPSB pricing strategy which resulted in them being awarded the contract. Additionally, the most 
cost efficient group won the award. 
In Experiment 3, only five groups participated in each phase of this experiment. 
Accordingly, with limited competition, the final award price reflected a great deal more 
variability between the award price ($9,519) and the true cost of the winning group ($8,021). For 
example, in Phase II of Experiment 3 (Table 10), Group 4 was awarded the contract and paid an 
award price which represents an 18.67-percent profit rate. Such a profit rate is dramatically 
higher than all previous experiments where their was almost twice the number of competitors. In 
fact, is every case where there were nine or more competitors, the profit paid to the winning 
contractor never exceeded the industry-wide profit rate. Accordingly, the following is submitted: 
Under the SPSB method, as the number of competitors increase, there is a 
tendency for less variability between the award price and the true COSt of 
the winning contractor. 
To further establish this observation, however, further experimentation and analysis involving 
varying numbers of competitors would be required. 
5. Experiment 4 - A Shift from the FPSB Method to SPSB Method 
As provided in Appendix C, Phases I and II of Experiment 4 requested each of the nine 
participating groups to provide a FPSB and SPSB price in response to a Government solicitation 
for ten infrared sensors (Phase I) and ten microprocessors (Phase II). The results are shown 
below in Table 11. 
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(Experiment 4,Phase I 
flricfüstry Average Cost "= $10,000 
irhdustry AverageProfit =8% 
ijGröüp jCost 1st 
Price 




 %  
Change 
1 10,200 10,685 4.75% 10,200 0.00% 
2 9,687 10,462 8.00% 9,687 0.00% 
3 10,476 11,300 7.87% 10,600 1.18% 
4 10,643 10,699 0.53% 10,536 -1.01% 
5 9,306 9,957 7.00% 9,400 1.01% 
6 10,817 11,399 5.38% 11,099 2.61% 
7 10,597 10,703 1.00% 10,597 0.00% 
8 10,030 10,500 4.69% 9,800 -2.29% 
9 9,244 10,500 13.59% 10,300 11.42% 
SPSBWirihmg Bidtfef- Group 5, Profit = 381 
\Experiment4, Phase II 
Ifhdiistry Average"Cost "= none provided 
Industry Average Profit= 12% 
Group]    Cost  1st ] % ] 2nd"" 
Price    1 Change ]   Price 
 %  
Change 
1 4,927 5,337 8.33% 4,977 1.01% 
2 3,708 4,005 8.00% 3,708 0.00% 
3 4,943 5,900 19.36% 5,500 11.27% 
4 5,832 6,269 7.49% 5,831 -0.02% 
5 6,280 6,908 10.00% 6,594 5.00% 
fi 4,971 5,488 10.40% 2 -99.96% 
7 3,060 3,243 5.98% 3,060 0.00% 
8 6,209 6,500 4.69% 6,200 -0.14% 
9 4,858 6,100 25.57% 5,800 19.39% 
ijSPSB Winning Bidder;-Group 6, P"rÖfi't'= -1,011" 
Table 11. Results from Experiment 4, Phases I & II. 
a. Experiment 4, Phase I 
As reflected above and observed in all previous experiments, the predominant 
FPSB pricing strategy was to set submit a bid price between one's true cost and the true cost- 
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plus-the-industry-wide profit rate. Similar to those exceptions found in earlier experiments, 
Group 9 has a bid price reflecting a profit rate of 13.59-percent that far exceeds the industry-wide 
profit rate of eight-percent. As was earlier mentioned, such a pricing strategy indicates a 
misunderstanding of competitive pricing strategies practiced by competitors under the FPSB 
method. 
The most interesting observation in this phase is the downward shift in bid prices 
when changing from the FPSB method to the SPSB method. This pricing pattern has been 
consistent throughout all other experiments. Accordingly, one can conclude that: 
When changing the method of solicitation for a product or service from 
FPSB to SPSB, a general reduction in bid prices should be expected. 
One known reason for the downward pricing trend is attributed to those groups 
shifting from atypical FPSB pricing strategy, where bid price is above true cost, to setting SPSB 
prices in accordance with the SPSB optimal pricing strategy where bid prices are equal to true 
costs.   Another possible reason, which was previously mentioned in Phase I of Experiment 1, is 
that the SPSB method is believed to intensify competition, thereby causing each group to reflect 
a bid price that is more competitive than found under the FPSB method. 
Phase I of Experiment 4 reflects another instance where the SPSB price is set 
slightly below the true cost. In Table 10, Group 4's rational for this strategy was, "We went 
below our cost with the assumption that the next higher bidder would probably be above our 
cost." Previously, it was shown how bidding in this manner is not representative of the optimal 
SPSB pricing strategy. However, when observing a tie for the winning lowest bid, where tie- 
breaking provisions call for the splitting of the award between the lowest tying bidders and 
awarding the third highest price, then bidding slightly below one's true cost could be the optimal 
SPSB pricing strategy. 
As was seen in previous experiments, the winning group in Phase I of 
Experiment 4 was not the most cost efficient group. As reflected in this phase, Group 5 won the 
award where Group 9 was the most cost efficient. After further consideration we can conclude 
that: 
Even under the SPSB method, the winning contractor may not always be 
the most cost efficient contractor when competing contractors are not well 
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versed in the nature of SPSB. Only in those instances where all groups bid 
according to the optimal pricing strategy will the most cost efficient group 
always be awarded a contract. 
b. Experiment 4, Phase II 
In addressing this phase, three interesting pricing strategies are highlighted. 
First, note Group 6's bid price of only two-dollars. Although this strategy practically guarantees 
winning award of the contract, it represents a tremendous risk of winning the award in an 
unprofitable position. This case was previously discussed in Chapter II (Table 5) where the 
lowest bid price was unrealistically set at one-dollar. Under the terms of the SPSB method, 
Group 6 wins the contract and is paid $3,060. Having atrue cost of $4,971, however, Group 6 
will realize a loss of $1,911 ($3,060 - $4,971 = -$1,911) which is obviously not optimal. In a 
real-world scenario, submitting an unrealistically low bid price such as this would strongly 
indicate that a contractor is employing a buy-in strategy. Although a buy-in strategy is not 
necessarily wrong, it should raise serious concerns as to whether a contractor has the means to 
perform the contract. In the Government's eyes, such a bid could represent a contractor that is 
not considered a responsible source of supply. Accordingly, under both the FPSB and SPSB 
methods, contractors would still have to be a responsive and responsible source of supply. 
The next pricing strategy to be addressed includes, once again, the case where 
bid prices are set slightly below one's true cost, as reflected in Groups 4 and 8's bid prices. As 
stated in Group 4's rationale, 'We wanted to ensure we'd at least cover our cost..., so we bid one- 
dollar below our cost, assuming the next higher bidder would be above [our cost]." Unlike the 
situation in Phase I where the industry-wide average cost was known, there was no industry-wide 
average cost provided in this phase. Consequently, there was no way to compare how one's cost 
were relative to the industry. The strategy presented here has its merit in that tie-breaking 
provisions were not known. 
The third, and final pricing strategy to be addressed includes setting a bid price 
far above one's true cost-plus-the-industry-wide profit rate. Specifically, Group 9 reflects a bid 
price with an applied 19.39-percent profit rate which is 6.39-percent above the industry-wide 
10
  Responsive and responsible is defined in Chapter I - Definitions, under the terminology of 
"Contractor (bidder)." 
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profit rate. Accordingly, Group 9 indicated that they should earn this high rate because the 
contract involved "developmental technology." Once again, we witness a total disregard for 
one's competition. 
6. Conclusions - A Shift from the FPSB Method to SPSB Method 
The experimentation presented so far reflects a variety of SPSB pricing strategies which 
has resulted in unpredictable outcomes. From the experiments we have analyzed, we have seen 
the following SPSB pricing strategies: 
• Strategy 1: Setting one's bid price equal to true cost (i.e., the optimal pricing strategy 
under the SPSB method) with the rationale that some profits would always be made if 
awarded a contract (32.4-percent of the SPSB prices submitted reflected this strategy). 
Thus far, there have been 22 occurrences of this strategy which has resulted in winning 
three of the eight SPSB solicitations. In accordance with the SPSB theory, winners 
who exercised this strategy always earned a profit. 
• Strategy 2: Setting one's bid price slightly below true cost with the rationale that the 
next lowest bidder would probably be higher than one's true cost (10.1-percent of the 
SPSB prices submitted reflected this strategy). There were no instances where bidding 
in this manner resulted in winning an award. However, it was previously noted that 
this strategy may represent the optimal SPSB pricing strategy under very specific 
circumstances. 
• Strategy 3: Setting one's bid price higher than true cost, yet lower than true cost-plus- 
the-industry-wide profit rate with the rationale of undercutting the competition's bid 
price (51.5-percent of the SPSB prices submitted reflected this strategy). Accordingly, 
this was one of the more popular strategies used under the SPSB method. Of the 
experiments conducted, 50-percent of those winning the competition exercised this 
strategy. 
• Strategy 4: Setting one's bid price above the true cost-plus-the-industry-wide profit 
rate (3.0-percent of the SPSB prices submitted reflected this strategy). Not 
surprisingly, this strategy was never successful. When competition exists and the 
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SPSB method is applied, one should never expect to witness the case where bidding in 
such a manner becomes profitable. 
• Strategy 5: Setting one's bid excessively low (e.g., equal to $1) to assure winning 
award with the rationale of bidding under a buy-in strategy (3.0-percent of the SPSB 
prices submitted reflected this strategy). Although such a strategy practically 
guarantees award, the long-term survivability of any contractor is questionable. 
Accordingly, bidding in such a manner did result in winning the award, however, the 
winning group did sustain a significant loss. 
One of the more interesting observations that occurred throughout all the four 
experiments was the downward pricing trend in bid prices when changing from the FPSB method 
to the SPSB method. As mentioned earlier, this was partially attributed to: 
• groups shifting from a typical FPSB pricing strategy, where the bid price is set above 
true cost, to setting SPSB prices in accordance with the SPSB optimal pricing strategy, 
where bid prices equal true costs. 
• the SPSB method being perceived as intensifying competition, thereby causing each 
group to reflect bid prices that are more competitive than found under the FPSB 
method. 
As was expected, the level of competition has an effect on the percentage of profit 
awarded in the SPSB method. As mentioned earlier: 
Under the SPSB method, as the number of competitors increase, there is 
less variability between the award price and the true cost of the winning 
contractor. 
In the above experiments several different pricing strategies were applied by groups who 
submitted bid prices subject to the terms of the FPSB method and the SPSB method. In 
conducting these experiments, however, these groups were never informed as to what other 
groups' bidding prices were and who was the winning bidder. Armed with such information, 
these groups could make more informed decisions in formulating future pricing strategies. 
Experimentation in this regard may provide trends in bidding behavior that could be beneficial to 
understanding second-pricing strategies. In the second set of experimentation, interesting trends 
do emerge that shed light in the application of the SPSB method. 
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B. EXPERIMENTATION WITH THE SECOND-PRICE AUCTION 
This section views the second-pricing mechanism as used within the context of 
auctioning. The mechanisms in second-price auctions is theoretically identical with the SPSB 
method.   In second-price auctions, "sealed hids are entered simultaneously, and the highest 
bidder wins the item and pays the second highest bid." Accordingly, 
What makes this type of auction so appealing is that the optimal bid is a 
dominant strategy; that is, it is independent of the actions of the other bidders. If 
an individual bids above his value, then he must face some probability of 
winning the item and paying more than his value, while if he bids below his 
value he must face some probability of someone else winning at a price below 
his value. The way to avoid these possibilities is for the individual to bid the 
value of the item. [Ref. 10, p. 136] 
The mechanisms found in both the SPSB method and second-price auctions is identical when one 
consider that the winning bidder (contractor) pays the second highest (lowest) bid price offered. 
Theoretically, the optimal pricing strategy is to bid at one's true value (true cost) of an item 
(contract). 
With this understanding of how the two are essentially the same, the thesis analyzes 
second-pricing auction experimentation conducted by the economist Dr. William Gates at Naval 
Postgraduate School and applies the findings to the SPSB method. 
1. The Setting for Experimentation 
To accomplish the experimentation of second-price auctions, Dr. Gates conducted five 
independent classroom experiments, with each experiment consisting of four sequential rounds of 
bidding. In each experiment, ten groups of graduate students from the Naval Postgraduate 
School were formed, where each group consisted of a three-member team.   Working 
independently, each team was given their unique "value" of an item to be offered at auction. 
Under the terms of a second-price auction, each team would then submit their sealed bids. Once 
submitted, a consolidated listing of all groups' valuations and bid prices were projected on an 
overhead, thereby allowing each group to view all other groups' valuations and bidding prices. 
The intentions for the "public" showing of this information was for each group to reassess and 
revise, if necessary, their strategies in the remaining three rounds of bidding. Table 12 provides 
an example of atypical overhead presented during the first round. 
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Experiment 1, Round 1 
\ Second Price Auction 
Group ;   Value          Bid 
1 9354 9354 
2 9789 10000 
3 9998 9950 
4 8915 6500 
5 9254 9255 
6 8562 6850 
7 9687 9600 
8 9543 9543 
9 8264 8264 
10 8176 8000 
Group 2 
Profit -161 
Table 12. Experiment 1, Round 1. 
In this round the winning bid was submitted by Group 2 having the highest bid price of 
$10,000. In accordance with the terms of the second-price auction, this group received the item 
and paid the next highest bid of $9,950 which was submitted by Group 3. Therefore, the first 
round of auctioning resulted in Group 2 winning the award with a -$161 profit (the winning 
bidder's value minus the next highest bid price; $9,789 - $9,950 = -$161). Immediately 
following the first round, all groups were provided a new set of unique values and were again 
requested to submit a bid. This process would be repeated until four successive rounds were 
completed. Additionally, where a tie exists for the highest bid, the winner was determined by a 
flip-of-the-coin. 
Accordingly, this experiment was conducted to determine if any pricing trends and/or 
predominant pricing strategies would emerge. This will be discussed in the next section. 
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2. Examination of Experiments 
In conducting an examination of all five experiments (which totaled twenty rounds of 
experimentation) the thesis will focus on the summary of data found in Appendix E. In this 
analysis, four overall trends emerge that are supported by this data. Each trend will now be 
discussed in detail. 
a.  Trend 1 - A percentage decrease of variation as rounds progressed 
The average percent of variation between groups' bid prices and their true 
valuations consistently decreased as each of the five experiments progressed from Round 1 to 
Round 4. The data supporting this statement are provided below in Table 13. 


























Total ''Variance" 23301.59 142.52 "TC32 TITuT 
: Ave rä g e Vä ria nce 4660.32 7XM -TM -znrr 
Table 13. Summary of Variances. 
In determining the percent of variation for each round, as reflected in Table 13 
above, refer to Table 14 which is an excerpt from Appendix E. 
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Experiment 1 r, Second Price Auction 
Round 1 
Group Value Bid 
1 9354 9354 
2 9789 10000 
3 9998 9950 
4 8915 6500 
5 9254 9255 
6 8562 6850 
7 9687 9600 
S 9543 9543 
9 8264 8264 
10 8176 8000 
Total 91542 -87316           =4226 
Group 2 % Var =   |4226 / 91542 
Profit -161 =    \       4.62 
Table 14. Experiment 1, Round 1, Second-Price Auction. 
For each round of each experiment, the "Value" and "Bid" columns were totaled 
as shown above, where totaled values equal 91542 and 87316, respectively. In subtracting one 
total from the other, a net difference was determined (91542 - 87316 = 4226). This difference 
was then devided by the sum of the 'Value" column which produced an average percentage 
variation between all ten groups for Round 1 of Experiment 1 (4226/91542 = .0462 or 4.62- 
percent). Accordingly, Round 1 of Experiment 1 has a percent of variation of 4.62-percent. 
Hence, one can conclude that Round 1 has an average of 4.62-percent variation between groups' 
true 'Value" and their "Bid" prices. 
Referring back to Table 13, following each successive round of bidding each 
group reassessed their bidding strategy and submitted, in general, a bid price closer to their true 
valuation. In applying this trend to the SPSB method, one would conclude that bid prices from 
contractors engaged in numerous successive SPSB solicitations would be expected to 
converge closer and closer to their true cost. Accordingly, as contractors continue 
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participating in SPSB solicitations, the greater the likelihood that their bid prices will be closer to 
their true cost. 
b. Trend 2 - Dominant bidding strategies 
In continuing our examination of the bidding strategies presented in the exercises 
found in Appendix E, note that the final round of all five experiments had only two in fifty cases 
where bidders bid below their true valuation. In fact, 46-percent of those bidding in the final 
round bid their true valuation while the remaining 50-percent bid above their true value. Of the 
50-percent that bided above their true valuation, 52-percent bid slightly above their true 
valuation11. This reflects an interesting behavioral pattern in that a majority of bidders will bid 
according to the optimal second-price strategy, or to take chances in bidding higher than their 
true valuation. Bidding higher than one's true value, you may recall, improves the chance of 
winning the auction, but concurrently increases the chance of winning in an unprofitable 
position. 
In applying this trend to the SPSB method, one would expect that contractors engaged 
in numerous successive SPSB solicitations will adopt a pricing strategy of setting bid prices 
equal to, or below their true cost. In those cases where contractors' prices are set below 
their true costs, half of these bids would be expected to be priced slightly below their true 
cost. It is interesting to contrast this finding with the first set of experiments where the majority 
of groups set their prices above their true costs. One may recall, however, that these groups set 
their bid prices without any knowledge of the successes (or failures) of their previous pricing 
strategies. In the current set of auctioning experiments, the vast majority (88.9-percent) of the 
pricing strategies consisted of bidding equal to, or higher than one's true cost. As indicated in 
the current set of experiments, one would expect the groups in the first set of experiments to 
eventually revise their pricing strategies in future SPSB solicitations towards submitting bid 
prices equal to, or lower than their true cost. 
c. Trend 3 - Consistency in bidding equal or slightly greater to one's true cost 
Those groups bidding equal to, or slightly greater than their true costs in the first 
three rounds of each experiment tended to remain with these strategies through to the final round 
11
   A bid price slightly above one's true value is defined here as a bid price being within one percent 
above one's true valuation. 
43 
(i.e., Round 4). Stated another way, once a group set their bid equal to, or slightly greater than 
their true value, they tended to stay with that pricing strategy for the remaining rounds of the 
experiment. 
Consequently, one might expect that contractors adopting the optimal SPSB 
pricing strategy of bidding their true cost are likely to remain with this strategy. 
d.  Trend 4 - Bidding equal to one's cost does not ensure winning the award 
In focusing on the final round of each of the five experiments, note that bidding a 
price equal to ones true value does not consistently result in winning auctions as shown below in 
Table 15. 
Experiments 1-5, Round 4 
Winning 
Group 
Percent ot Bid Price 









a 0.11% 0.22% 
1 11.98% -2.69% 
10 1173% -1.68% 
6 10.00% 0.10% 
2 0.00% 5.26% 
Table 15. Winning groups of Round 4. 
As seen above, in the final round of each of the five experiments there exists 
different strategies that resulted in winning second-price auctions. For example, 
• Experiment 1: The pricing strategy used by Group 8 was to bid slightly above their 
true value which resulted in earning .22-percent profit. In the SPSB method, this 
would be equivalent to a contractor bidding slightly below their true cost and winning 
the contract and earning a rate of .22-percent profit. 
• Experiments 2 through 4: The pricing strategy used by Groups 1, 10, and 3 reflect 
the strategy of bidding above (vice slightly above) one's true value. In this manner of 
bidding Groups 1 and 10 won the award but earned a negative profit. As for Group 3, 
they bid in the same manner, but, in contrast to groups 1 and 10, earned a very small 
0.10-percent profit. Consequently, it appears that bidding higher than one's true cost is 
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not especially profitable. In applying these observations to the SPSB method, one 
might conclude that contractors pursuing a pricing strategy of setting bids below their 
true cost is not profitable. Obviously, the long-term implications of consistently using 
such a strategy would ultimately result in bankruptcy. 
• Experiment 5: This experiment reflects the only case where bidding equal to one's true 
cost resulted in winning an auction. In this case it is noted that the profit earned under 
this pricing strategy far exceeded those profits earned under the pricing strategies seen 
in Round 4 of Experiments 1 through 4. In applying this to the SPSB method, 
therefore, would indicate that setting a bid price equal to one's true cost generates the 
highest profit when compared to other pricing strategies. 
Although the results above compel the reader to accept that the best SPSB 
strategy for a contractor is to bid their true cost, this thesis hesitates to make this, or any other 
strong conclusions due to the limited number of experiments conducted. Accordingly, further 
experimentation and analysis would be warranted that may reinforce or change the findings 
reflected above. 
C. THE SPSB METHOD - GENERAL OBSERVATIONS 
To summarize the observations from experimentation found in this chapter, the following 
conclusions regarding the SPSB method are reiterated: 
• Contractors bidding higher than their true cost act irrationally because they increase the 
risk of losing an award, thereby diminishing the chance of earning any sum of profit. 
• Bidding higher than true value does not improve or increase one's opportunity for 
earning additional profit 
• As the number of competitors increase, there is a tendency for less variability between 
the award price and the true cost of the winning contractor. 
• When changing the method of solicitation for a product or service from FPSB to SPSB, 
a general reduction in bid prices should be expected. 
• The winning contractor may not always be the most cost efficient contractor when 
competing contractors are not well versed in the nature of SPSB. Only in those 
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instances where all contractors bid according to the optimal pricing strategy will the 
most cost efficient contractor always be awarded a contract. 
• Bid prices from contractors engaged in numerous successive SPSB solicitations would 
be expected to converge closer and closer to their true cost. 
• Contractors engaged in numerous successive SPSB solicitations will adopt a pricing 
strategy of setting bid prices equal to their true cost. In those cases where contractors' 
prices are set below their true costs, half of these bids would be expected to be priced 
slightly below their true cost. 
• Contractors adopting the optimal SPSB pricing strategy of bidding their true cost are 
likely to remain with this strategy. 
D. SUMMARY 
In this chapter the thesis has examined two sets of experiments which have revealed 
numerous interesting observations. In the first set of experiments a consistent reduction in bid 
prices was observed when shifting from the FPSB method to the SPSB method. Additionally, 
the theoretical mechanisms which formed the basis of the SPSB method presented in Chapter II 
were shown. In the second set of experiments, trends in second-price auctioning were observed 
which imply that contractors who are engaged in successive contract SPSB solicitations will, in 
general, bid equal to, or below their true cost. In the next chapter, survey results received from 
Government and private industry respondents concerning the applicability of the SPSB method 
in Government contracting is addressed. 
46 
IV. SURVEY RESULTS REGARDING THE SPSB METHOD 
To assess the opinions of Government and private industry contracting professionals 
regarding the use and applicability of the SPSB method in Government contracting, this chapter 
presents a series of survey questions asked with analysis and discussion on the responses offered. 
The chapter is segregated into two categories; Category 1 consisting of responses from private 
industry contracting professionals, and Category 2 consisting of responses from Government 
contracting professionals. In separating the two categories in this manner, a comparison between 
the buyer, the Government, and the seller, private industry, is provided. A full listing of 
Government and private industry contracting professionals surveyed is found in Appendix A. A 
total of ninety responses were received from Government contracting professionals and thirty- 
two responses were received from private industry contracting professionals. A complete listing 
of survey questions is provided in Appendix B. As reflected in Appendix B, Section I of the 
survey determines the background and experience of the respondents and Section II contains the 
those questions requesting the perceptions and opinions from respondents regarding the SPSB 
method. 
A. THE SPSB METHOD SURVEY - PRIVATE INDUSTRY 
1. Respondents Background and Experience - Private Industry 
A total of thirty-two survey responses were received from private industry contracting 
professionals. Their background and experience were as follows. 
• Sixteen of the thirty-two respondents consisted of senior/executive management. Of 
these sixteen respondents, fifteen had over ten-years, and one had five to ten years 
experience in the procurement/contracting field. Furthermore, of the Sixteen 
respondents, fourteen had over ten years, one had five to ten years, and one had three to 
five years experience specifically in Fixed-Firm Price (FFP) type contracting. 
• Sixteen additional respondents were identified as being contracting specialists (e.g., 
those individuals who drafted, solicited, awarded contracts, or were involved in the 
preparation of bid proposals). Of these sixteen respondents, fourteen had over ten- 
years, and two had between five to ten years experience in the procurement/contracting 
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field. Furthermore, of these sixteen respondents, thirteen had over ten years, and three 
had three to five years experience specifically in Fixed-Firm Price (FFP) type 
contracting. 
• All but one of the respondents were employed by a large company (e.g., employed by 
large contractors such as Lockheed, Martin Marietta, Boeing, Motorola, TRW, etc.). 
In view of the above, the respondents from private industry were highly experienced 
individuals which had, in general, over ten years in the procurement/contracting field and over 
ten years of direct involvement with FFP type contracts. Accordingly, their responses should be 
considered highly credible. Unfortunately, the vast majority of respondents represented large 
companies instead of small business. Therefore, the survey responses received from private 
12 industry do not adequately represent small business concerns. 
2. SPSB Survey Questions - Private Industry Respondents 
a. Question 1: Have you ever been exposed to the Second Price Solicitation 
(SPSB) Method? 
All thirty-two respondents answered that they had never been exposed to the 
Second Price Solicitation (SPSB) Method. This response was anticipated in that the SPSB 
method had never been previously used in Government procurement and contracting. 
Accordingly, it is assumed that this survey was the first (initial) opportunity that private industry 
contracting professional had in expressing their perceptions and opinions regarding the SPSB 
method. 
b. Question 2: If allowed by law, would you as a buyer consider soliciting a 
Firm-Fixed (sealed bid) type contract using the Second Price Solicitation (SPSB) Method? 
In response to this question, five of thirty-two respondents answered 'Yes, with 
reservations." Accordingly, this response indicates that the SPSB method might be considered 
by a minority of the private industry contracting professionals . 
12
   Of note, several responses were received from Government small business regional offices which did 
provide some opportunity for small business representation. 
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Six of the thirty-two respondents answered "Neutral/uncertain" primarily 
because of 1) their being unfamiliar with the SPSB method and 2) a lack of "benchmark data" for 
determining the success of the SPSB method. Another concern expressed was, 
Although the second price solicitation method does permit the focus to reside on 
the cost side of the pricing equation, it introduces an element of risk beyond the 
reasonable control of management. Essentially profit is determined solely by 
forces outside the control of the seller. 
In considering this statement, the SPSB method is perceived as posing a "risk" with regard to the 
amount, or percentage, of profit a winning bidder can earn. It should be noted, however, that by 
minimizing costs, management maximizes potential profit which is a form of controlling profit 
"risk." 
Fifteen of thirty-two answered that they would not consider using the SPSB 
method in soliciting a contract. Included in their responses were the following. 
The assumption that a bidder will allow the difference between its bid price and 
the next highest price to determine the profit is questionable. More probably, the 
bidder will bid a reasonable price including profit and then accept the higher 
price. Consequently, the Government pays more than it would under the First 
Price Solicitation Method [FPSB method]. 
The Second Price may be pennies more than the lowest bid, So the low bidder 
gets the award with pennies profit.  Where is the incentive! 
No businessman would continuously bid cost...The expectations for profit [are] 
not predictable so businessmen would not participate. 
.. .This method is grossly unfair to contractors and will ultimately be bad for the 
Government. In a changing environment (fewer contracts, changes in supplier 
sources, smaller production runs, etc.) contractors can not determine with 
complete accuracy in advance what their "actual costs" are. There are risks in all 
fixed price contracts, and these risks are often compensated for by proposing 
profit. Under the proposed scenario, the amount of risk the contractor assumes is 
determined by his competitors pricing strategy...The risks of FFP contracting 
require a reasonable profit.    v 
Accordingly, these respondents believed that the SPSB method does not 
guarantee a reasonable, or incentivizing, profit which is considered the fundamental element of 
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FFP type contracting. Apparently, there is a gross misunderstanding of the SPSB method by 
both Government and private industry respondents. In several instances, their survey responses 
addressed the lack of contractors' ability to control their profit margin, or return on investment, 
when setting bid prices. When developing a bid price, contractors should accumulate all relevant 
costs, to include, for example, a minimal rate of return (or profit) that reflects corporate policy. 
Furthermore, setting a bid price greater or less than this amount would represent an opportunity 
trade-off. As such, setting a bid price below all relevant costs would represent a trade-off 
between earning less profit to increase the chances of winning an award. Additionally, this 
strategy may reflect a buy-in strategy on behalf of the contractor. Conversely, setting a bid price 
above all relevant cost would represent a trade-off between increasing profit while increasing the 
chances of losing the award to a lower bidder. 
There were three comments that expressed concerns that the SPSB method 
would introduce negotiations in the form of "letting a contract for an amount different [than] that 
proposed [which] constitutes an counter offer." Accordingly, in Government contracting, a 
counter offer is considered a form of negotiating, which is not allowed in Government sealed 
bidding. [Ref. 3, p. 242] As presented in this thesis, however, the SPSB method, like the FPSB 
method, was intended to exclude any form of negotiations. 
Fundamentally, an offer gives the offeree the power to accept or reject. The 
counteroffer switches this power from the original oferree to the original offeror. 
Is there even an argument that the award of an SPSB contract gives the original 
offeror the power to accept or reject the award?...It should be clear to all parties 
from the description of the method that no such powers are granted or intended. 
The offeror would be saying in his offer that this is my price and I am giving the 
buyer the power to accept my offer but at the definite price of the next highest 
offeror. There is a price certain and a firm offer. There is no exchange of 
powers. [Ref. 12] 
Therefore, implementing the SPSB method would require statutory language to the effect that 
the final bid price awarded is not considered a "counter offer" subject to negotiation. 
The remaining seven of thirty-two respondents elected not to answer this 
question. 
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c Question 3: If allowed by law, would you as a seller consider submitting a 
bid for a Firm-Fixed (sealed bid) type contract using the Second Price Solicitation (SPSB) 
Method? 
In answering this question, two respondents replied "Yes, definitely" while eight 
respondents replied 'Yes, with reservations." Their comments included, 
[I] would prefer that the Government continue to use the Sealed Bid method [the 
FPSB method]. However, if the Government insisted on the latter [the SPSB 
method], [I] would participate on that basis. 
In general, if the Government were to issue a solicitation having the SPSB method, roughly one- 
third of the private industry respondents surveyed would respond with a bid. Accordingly, this 
would indicate that using the SPSB method could potentially reduce the number of competitors 
by two-thirds. 
Thirteen respondents provided the response "Neutral/uncertain" as to whether 
they would submit a bid under the terms of the SPSB method. Some stated that they might 
participate, however, indicated that their pricing strategy would not change from previous 
practices (i.e., their bid price would reflect their sealed bid (FPSB) strategy). Several 
respondents expressed concern over the expected profit to be earned if awarded the contract. 
Accordingly, when a profit entailing an "acceptable" return on investment could be obtained, 
they would participate in an SPSB solicitation. Others were uncertain as to whether they would 
participate in an SPSB solicitation because of their perceived "add[ed] element of risk" that could 
not be controlled. As well, others would hesitate to participate because of their unfamiliarity 
with second-pricing. 
The remaining nine respondents would not submit a bid in response to a SPSB 
solicitation. As discussed before, their concerns consisted of "not having any assurances of 
earnings that would result in an acceptable ROI/ROE." Other statements included, 
For the Second Price Solicitation Method to be a viable option an assumption 
must be made that each of the competitors have comparable accounting systems 
to the extent that "actual" [true] costs are recognized in a like manner.. Also, if 
true competition exists, the variance between the first and second price may be 
so small as to result in a loss to the awardee. 
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This approach is contrary to the basic free enterprise system. A contractor 
should win or lose on his own bid - and be paid based on his own bid...The 
Government would be creating an artificial situation that is a "roll of the dice" 
for would-be winners of competition. As a tax payer, I want my Government to 
pay the correct price - not someone else's. 
A related statement which merits mentioning was, "Why should a businessman risk his profit 
return on the expertise (or lack thereof) of other bidders?" In fact, experimentation in Chapter III 
revealed numerous instances where flawed bidding strategies resulted in winning awards. Such 
occurrences would tend to label the SPSB method as another extension to game playing, where 
contractors are continually trying to second-guess one another. 
One interesting response was as follows, 
This [second price] sealed bid [method] would reveal to all what my estimated 
costs for the item or services [is]. That is customarily treated as proprietary and 
competitive sensitive [information]. This [cost revealing] mechanism will make 
it public information [which would then be] available to the competition. 
In considering this statement, one would question whether the SPSB method would tend to limit 
competition because of contractors' unwillingness to reveal their costs (i.e., their bid price) to 
their competitors. In setting one's bid price equal to their cost, it is interesting and worth 
considering whether a contractor's bid should be regarded as proprietary information. In 
conducting negotiations for cost type contracts, "individual contractor costs are usually 
considered proprietary information." As was mentioned earlier, however, a contractor's bid price 
includes all relevant costs, including an acceptable profit margin. In that bid prices do not reflect 
individual cost elements, treating a bid price as proprietary information, as discussed above, is 
unfounded. 
Overall, private industry's willingness to participate by bidding in response to a 
Government SPSB solicitation was mixed. On one hand, some contractors would bid if they 
were assured adequate profits, while others would not because SPSB runs contrary to free market 
forces. 
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d. Question 4: Do you believe that the Second Price Solicitation (SPSB) 
Method lessens administrative requirements for contractors? 
Of the thirty-two responses, only four believed the SPSB method lessens 
administrative requirements for contractors. The remaining twenty-eight of respondents believed 
that the SPSB method would have no effect. For a majority of these responses, respondents 
indicated that there would be no change because contractors would still, "evaluate actual costs 
and extrapolate to support estimates for future work." Additionally, "...the same costing effort 
would be required and management would still have to set a pricing strategy" where the "bulk of 
effort is involved in determining cost." In fact, determining a pricing strategy was considered 
necessary in light of the "expertise (or lack thereof) of other bidders" and the "risks...to be 
factored into the price." Accordingly, these respondents believe that formulating price/counter- 
price strategies would still be necessary in the SPSB method, despite the SPSB theory of simply 
setting one's bid price equal to their true cost. 
...for procurements under $100,000...profit determination is relatively simple. 
Most administrative effort involves cost estimating. Profit is a relatively small 
amount in the total price. Thus, the internal review procedures will not change. 
In fact, the decision to bid at zero profit may cause more extensive reviews. 
Many companies are not permitted to submit bids with a zero profit without 
higher management approval. 
Accordingly, the introduction of the SPSB method may actually result in 
increasing the administrative effort on behalf of the private industry. 
e. Question 5: Do you believe that the Second Price Solicitation (SPSB) 
Method lessens administrative requirements for the Government? 
In response to this question, two of the thirty-two respondents answered "Yes, 
extensively," with six responding "Yes, to a small extent," and twenty-four responding "No." 
Although there were a handful of respondents that thought the SPSB method would lessen 
administrative requirements, they did express some pessimism such as, "Once again a method 
that avoids the thinking process [on behalf of the Government]!" and "[It is] unlikely that [the] 
Second Price Solicitation Method would make market surveys [for price 
reasonableness].. .unnecessary." 
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Comments from those in private industry that believe the SPSB method does not 
lessen the administrative requirements for the Government state that the pre-award administrative 
efforts such as "developing specifications, securing budgets, evaluating proposals for technical 
compliance, etc.," and "determining responsible/responsiveness" do not change. As further 
stated, the award process becomes "more involved" under the SPSB method in that the 
Government would have to draft an "explanation letter" for the low bidder explaining how the 
final contract price, which was not the winning bidder's price, was determined. One final 
comment implied that the SPSB method would "generate claims and protests that would far 
exceed current practices." (Unfortunately, these respondents failed to provided any reasoning as 
to why there would be an increase in protests and claims.) Therefore, the Government would 
expend additional resources in litigation. 
Overall, the majority of those in private industry were highly skeptical that they, 
or Government contracting agencies/commands would see any reductions in their administrative 
requirements under the SPSB method. Additionally, some even believed that administrative 
requirements would actually increase. 
f. Question 6: Do you believe that the Second Price Solicitation (SPSB) 
Method would increase or decrease competition ? 
The majority of private industry respondents indicated that there would be no 
change, or a decrease, in competition with the introduction of the SPSB method. Specifically, 
fifteen responded "No increase/decrease," ten responded "Probable decrease," and five responded 
"Definite decrease." Only one respondent believed that competition would "Probable increase" 
while another stated there would be a "definite increase in the short-run" and a "definite decrease 
in the long-run." Accordingly, one respondent offered the following. 
Given the over capacity in the defense industry, competition between contractors 
is already intense. Contractors would, in practice, not adhere to...the theoretical 
assumption of bidding actual [true] cost, particularly when survival of an 
individual company depends upon the business won. Competition in the short- 
run would likely increase as companies would bid lower than otherwise to win 
the business, in hope that the second higher price amount would cushion their 
losses... 
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It was further implied that competition in the long-run would decrease as contractors leave the 
defense industry for more lucrative business in the private sector. 
In a closer examination of these responses from private industry, those who 
thought that competition would not change, or decrease, also indicated that they were either 
uncertain, or against, participating in SPSB solicitations. 
g. Question 7: Would you be interested in obtaining additional information 
concerning the Second Price Solicitation (SPSB) Method? 
In asking this question, it was believed that those answering in the affirmative 
might consider participating in future SPSB solicitations. Additionally, this question was 
presented to gauge the level of interest from private industry in the SPSB method. Having stated 
this, twenty-two of thirty-two respondents (6 8.75-percent) were not interested in receiving 
additional information on the SPSB method, while ten of thirty-two respondents (31.25-percent) 
were. Accordingly, the conclusion is that a majority of private industry contracting professionals 
are not willing to consider future applications of the SPSB method. 
h. Additional comments: 
The following highlights additional comments from private industry contracting 
professionals that have not been previously cited, but are pertinent to the SPSB method. 
Profit is the cornerstone of the competitive environment. To remove this 
element would greatly increase the risk to the contractor. In those instances 
where competition is great, the potential for loss by an awardee increases 
[assuming that the contractor is compelled to bid below his cost]. In those 
instances where competition is slight, the potential for the Government to pay 
greater than fair and reasonable price would increase. 
V 
In recalling experimentation in Chapter III (specifically, Experiment 3, Phase II), the above 
statement is supported to the extent that when competitors are few, there exists a higher 
likelihood that the winning contractor would receive a significantly higher profit rate. 
The [SPSB] idea is totally illogical to me. I...disagree that this would 
accomplish the [stated] objectives [of the SPSB method which] are already being 
accomplished by with the sealed bidding [FPSB], or at least accomplished as 
well as they would...under the [the] Second Price Solicitation Method. The 
process of sealed bidding is working today. I suggest we leave this process 
alone. 
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I have significant reservations about this approach to bidding! First I think it 
will result in more "game playing" and "gambling" than already exists in the 
fixed price sealed bid contracting world. Second, it appears to be a ploy for 
reducing contractor profit margins; it might work for a while, but I would be 
concerned that in the long run it might reduce competition and/or encourage 
collusive bidding in areas where there is a very limited number of suppliers. 
Putting into place practices which vector contractors to submit bids without 
profit is contrary to stated Government policy and detrimental to the 
Government/ Contractor relationship. Contractors need and deserve reasonable 
profit on the work they do for the Government. 
Accordingly, private industry is highly skeptical in the application of the SPSB 
method because of a perceived 1) loss in "profit margins" and 2) unnecessary increase in "game 
playing." 
B. THE SPSB METHOD SURVEY - GOVERNMENT 
1. Respondents Background and Experience - Government 
A total of ninety survey responses were received from Government contracting 
professionals. Their experience and background were as follows. 
• Fourteen of the Government respondents consisted of those who formulated, issued or 
audited Government contracting policy. Of these fourteen, thirteen had over ten-years, 
and one had between five to ten years experience in the procurement/contracting field. 
Furthermore, of the fourteen respondents, twelve respondents had over ten years, and 
two had five to ten years experience specifically in Fixed-Firm Price (FFP) type 
contracting. 
• Seventy-six additional respondents were identified as Government contracting 
specialists who either drafted, solicited, awarded contracts or performed post-contract 
administration. Of the seventy-six respondents, fifty-eight had over ten years, twelve 
had between five to ten years, and six had three to five years experience in the 
procurement/contracting field. Furthermore, of the seventy-six respondents, fifty-five 
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had over ten years, eleven had five to ten years, and eight had three to five years 
experience specifically in FFP type contracting. 
Similar to the respondents in private industry, the majority of Government contracting 
professionals were highly experienced individuals with over ten years in the procurement/ 
contracting field and over ten years direct involvement with FFP type contracts. Accordingly, 
the responses received from Government contracting professionals should be considered highly 
credible. 
2. SPSB Survey Questions - Government Respondents 
a. Question 1: Have you ever been exposed to the Second Price Solicitation 
(SPSB) Method? 
All but one of the ninety respondents answered that they had never been exposed 
to the Second Price Solicitation (SPSB) Method. Similar to the responses received from private 
industry contracting professionals, this response was anticipated in that the SPSB method had 
never been previously used in Government procurement and contracting. Accordingly, it is 
assumed that this survey was the first (initial) opportunity that Government respondents had in 
expressing their perceptions and opinions regarding the SPSB method. The one positive 
response had only heard of second-pricing but could not elaborate further. 
b. Question 2: If allowed by law, would you as a buyer consider soliciting a 
Firm-Fixed (sealed bid) type contract using the Second Price Solicitation (SPSB) Method? 
Of the ninety Government respondents, thirty-one answered "Yes, with 
reservations." Before adopting the SPSB method, however, "more information would be needed 
before endeavoring in this, or any other innovative scheme." Although numerous Government 
responses indicated a willingness in using the SPSB method, there was still reluctance that 
private industry would be willing to participate. 
I find it hard to believe that contractors would reveal actual costs to their 
competitors and allow someone else to set their profit, which could be very low. 
Quite a gamble for the contractor. 
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Eighteen respondents replied "Neutral/uncertain" as to whether they would 
consider using the SPSB method. Numerous respondents indicated that they needed more 
information about the SPSB method before its implementation. Additionally, there were 
concerns of buy-in strategies that could possibly be detrimental to the Government-private 
industry relationship. 
The majority of the Government respondents, fort-one of ninety, indicated that 
they would not consider using the SPSB method in soliciting FFP type contracts. 
I believe the free market pressures would cause each competitor to "discount" his 
or her bid in order to win the award. This would then cause too much game 
playing and added risk. Since the contractor would, in addition to estimating 
his/her projected costs, would now attempt to lower their bid by an amount 
he/she would expect the next lowest offeror to bid. In effect, this method would 
add risk by introducing more unknowns to the process... 
Industry will not be driven to bid a price with no profit. I would expect 
proposed prices comparable to [the] first price method with the end result being 
that the Government ends up paying a price higher than we would have received 
under the first price solicitation method. 
Several Government respondents added that they did not believe that contractors would be 
awarded a reasonable profit or "fair rate of return" under the SPSB method. For example, "where 
many competitors exist, the cost difference between the lowest bidders would be very small," 
entailing that the winning bidder would only be awarded a "relatively small portion of profit in 
comparison to current sealed bid practices." This belief was also expressed by private industry 
respondents. As was discussed with private industry, the concept that profit is not included in 
the SPSB method is incorrect. Accordingly, setting a bid should include all relevant costs, 
including a margin of profit. 
Others indicated a concern that the Government would begin receiving inferior 
products due to cost cutting practices by contractors which would eventually degrade the quality 
of their products. (One must consider if this situation does not already exist.) One respondent 
expressed that "The federal procurement system is already viewed by the public with distrust. I 
feel the second price method would only solidify their concerns of a system genuinely gone bad." 
Accordingly, those who perceive that an adversarial environment exist between the Government 
and private industry, then the introduction of the SPSB method would only worsen this situation. 
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Many respondents considered the SPSB method as "ill-conceived" and "too contrary to normal 
business practices in the U.S. and difficult for the vast majority of smaller bidders to understand 
or accept." 
c Question 3: If allowed by law, would you as a seller consider submitting a 
bid for a Firm-Fixed (sealed bid) type contract using the Second Price Solicitation (SPSB) 
Method? 
Government contracting professionals surveyed were not asked this question 
because they are never in the position of being a "seller." Therefore, no response was provided. 
d Question 4: Do you believe that the Second Price Solicitation (SPSB) 
Method lessens administrative requirements for contractors? 
In contrast to private industry's overwhelming response that there would be no 
lessening of the administrative function, approximately one-third of Government respondents 
(twenty-seven of ninety) thought this function would decrease to a small extent. One respondent 
did comment that a small reduction would occur "only if the contractor is willing to let someone 
else [i.e., another competing contractor] determine profit. Not very likely." 
The remaining two-thirds of Government respondents did not believe that 
contractors would see a lessening in their administrative requirements. The vast majority of 
respondents in this category thought there would no change because contractors would continue 
to analyze and formulate "realistic" bid prices as they have done in the past. Accordingly, they 
would still accumulate 1) data necessary in forecasting expected costs, 2) competitor's pricing 
strategies to formulate counter-pricing strategies and 3) data identifying return on investment that 
will provide "some type of idea of the potential profit margin" to be gained from the contract. In 
fact, there were a number of respondents who thought there would be an increase in the 
administrative function because "contractors will have another complication to deal with" which 
would "require more pricing strategies to determine how...they will bid." 
Overall, Government respondents were highly skeptical the contractors would 
see any reduction in administrative requirements. 
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e. Question 5: Do you believe that the Second Price Solicitation (SPSB) 
Method lessens administrative requirements for the Government? 
Of the ninety Government respondents, four replied 'Yes, extensively" and 
seventeen replied "Yes, to a small extent." Accordingly, twenty-three percent of Government 
contracting professionals believed that their administrative requirements would be lessened, to 
some extent. 
However, sixty-seven Government respondents replied that there would be no 
lessening of the Government administrative requirements. In fact, numerous respondents in this 
category believed that the administrative requirements would increase. 
This practice may yield lower initial Government costs, but increases greatly the 
probability of contractor performance problems such as inferior material usage, 
less experienced personnel and delays due to the inability to show profitability. 
Government involvement would probable be greatly increased due to these 
problems. 
Other respondents cited that Government administrative requirements would increase due to the 
additional step of determining the next lowest bid price. Furthermore, "additional time would be 
spent dealing with 'hot line' complaints trying to explain why an award was made at a price 
higher than on the bid." 
Any situation where the PCO [Program Contracting Officer] would be paying 
other than proposed on a fixed price basis would probably require additional 
analysis and/or documentation. 
A majority of the respondents commented that the Government would still need to 1) determine 
price/cost reasonableness to assure contractor's ability to perform, and 2) conduct the market 
research necessary in determining responsiveness of prospective Government contractors. 
Additionally, one respondent asked the question, "What about the Contracting Officer 
determining the low [bid] as not [being] fair and reasonable - then does the second low become 
the first low?" "You still have to open all the bids and would still be subject to protests." In 
view of this, one would expect additional protests and claims which would result in increased 
post-award administrative requirements. 
Two additional respondents elected not to answer this question. 
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/ Question 6: Do you believe that the Second Price Solicitation (SPSB) 
Method would increase or decrease competition ? 
Twenty-five of the ninety respondents indicated that they would expect a 
decrease in competition under the SPSB method. Specifically, four replied there would be a 
"Definite decrease" and twenty-one replied "Probable decrease." The majority of respondents 
who indicated that a reduction in competition would occur stated that contractors would be 
unwilling to engage in Government contracts that could result in unacceptably low profits. 
Accordingly, uncertainties in earning would reduce the number of competitors. As expressed by 
two respondents, 
I believe that most responsible contractors would not bid without profit. Thus, 
this [SPSB] method would encourage and reward new inexperienced contractors 
to bid and win jobs. This could be harmful to their business as a continued lack 
or low profit will drive them out of business. 
The theory.. .would appear to act as a deterrent to competition. It is asking the 
vendor community to bid at cost, without regard to profit. The obvious question 
raised by this theory is why would any vendor participate in Government Sealed 
Bids, by bidding at cost, when a winning bid could be awarded for as little [as a] 
penny's difference. America's enterprise system relies on the profit motive, this 
type of contracting will have a chilling effect on competition. 
In considering the forty-four respondents that replied that there would be "No 
increase/decrease" in competition, one might conclude that implementing the SPSB method 
would, in general, be accepted by the private industry. If, through further experimentation, the 
number of competitors remains constant when using the SPSB method, then this conclusion 
could be substantiated. Unfortunately, no other remarks were provided by these respondents that 
would clarify their responses. (Also worthy on note, approximately one-half of the private 
industry contracting professionals surveyed also responded that no change in competition would 
be expected.) 
Of the fifteen Government respondents that believed there would be in increase 
in competition, one stated that "contractors would probably see it [the SPSB method] as an 
opportunity for windfall profits." Unfortunately, no other statements were provided by these 
respondents. 
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Six additional respondents elected not to answer this question. 
g. Question 7: Would you be interested in obtaining additional information 
concerning the Second Price Solicitation (SPSB) Method? 
In asking this question, it was believed that those Government contracting 
professionals answering in the affirmative would consider using the SPSB method in future 
Government contracting. Additionally, this question was presented to gauge the level of interest 
from those in Government regarding the SPSB method. Accordingly, forty-nine of ninety 
Government respondents (54.4-percent) were not interested in obtaining additional information 
on the SPSB method, while thirty-seven of ninety respondents (41.1-percent) were interested. 
An additional four respondents elected not to answer this question. 
h. Additional comments: 
Several additional comments were received from Government contracting 
professionals who were concerned that award prices under the SPSB method might not be "fair 
and reasonable." As defined by Stanley N. Sherman, a fair and reasonable price is a "price that is 
fair to both parties, considering the agreed-upon conditions, promised quality, and timeliness of 
contract performance..." [Ref. 11, p. 436] Respondents comments included, "How can a contract 
be awarded at what should be considered a fair and reasonable price when the award price is 
based on another offerer's costs?" 
Have you considered whether Second Price Solicitation will result in a 
reasonable profit? If offerers propose actual cost, the next high[er] offerer's 
proposal may be so close as to not provide a reasonable profit - or if there is a 
disparity between the offers the contract may result in a windfall profit. 
The biggest fallacy of this contracting method is the assumption that the 
differential between the low offerer's actual cost and the second low offerer's 
actual cost represents a "fair and reasonable profit." 
Once again, there is a misunderstanding on the behalf of Government respondents that a margin 
of profit is not included in setting a SPSB price. As was previously discussed, a profit margin 
should be included in a contractor's bid price, which would ensure the contractor a fair and 
reasonable award price. However, there could be occurrences where the Government might pay 
windfall profits which would represent a price that would not be considered fair and reasonable. 
62 
Consequently, some respondents feel that this situation would result in additional claims and 
protests. 
On a related issue, under the SPSB method, the Government would have to 
determine price reasonableness on both the lowest and the second lowest bidder. As related by 
one respondent, "in current Government sealed bidding practices, only the lowest bidder's price 
has to found as price reasonable." Therefore, this would entail an additional "administrative 
requirement" for the Government. 
C. A SUMMARY OF THE SPSB METHOD SURVEY - A COMPARISON 
As a summary of the perceptions and opinions cited above, the following general 
observations are provided that compare and contrast survey responses received from Government 
and private industry. 
Question 1: Have you ever been exposed to the Second Price Solicitation (SPSB) 
Method? 
Virtually all Government and private industry respondents had no previous exposure to 
the SPSB method. Accordingly, this survey represents Has first (initial) opportunity they for 
them to analyze and provide their perceptions and opinions regarding the SPSB method. 
Question 2: If allowed by law, would you as a buyer consider soliciting a Firm- 
Fixed (sealed bid) type contract using the Second Price Solicitation (SPSB) Method? 
In general, the comments expressed by both Government and private industry regarding 
this question were the same. In all, approximately fifty-five percent of Government and private 
industry respondents were hesitant as to whether they would, as a buyer, use the SPSB method. 
This response stemmed primarily from 1) unfamiliarity with the SPSB method and 2) a lack of 
test information. 
Both Government and private industry respondents choosing not use the SPSB method 
based their response on the uncertainty that the winning bidder would earn an acceptable level of 
profit. Stated another way, there is no guarantee for a return on investment under the SPSB 
method because the award price is based upon the next lowest bidder's price, which is both 
unknown and uncontrollable by the winning bidder. Accordingly, pricing strategies under the 
63 
SPSB method were perceived as another form of game playing. With no definite expectation of 
profit, the respondents believed there would be no incentive for engaging in the competition. 
As stated previously, the above responses reflect a gross misunderstanding of the SPSB 
method which should include a margin of profit. 
Question 3: If allowed by law, would you as a seller consider submitting a bid for a 
Firm-Fixed (sealed bid) type contract using the Second Price Solicitation (SPSB) Method? 
Because Government respondents are not "sellers," they were not asked this question. 
Therefore, the following is a summary of responses provided from private industry contracting 
professionals. 
Approximately one-third of the respondents indicated that they would submit a bid under 
the terms of the SPSB method. However, most of these respondents had reservations and stated 
that they would participate only if the Government insisted in using the SPSB method. A 
conclusion, therefore, is that approximately two-thirds of the available contractors might not 
participate, thereby limiting competition. 
Of those respondents that were either uncertain, or not willing, to participate, their 
primary concerns included 1) unfamiliarity with the SPSB method, 2) lack of assurances of 
earning an acceptable level of profit, and 3) the inclusion of artificial rules in sealed bidding 
which create additional game playing. Additionally, one respondent correctly described the 
situation where, under the theory of the SPSB method, bid prices submitted are equal a 
contractor's cost. Under this situation, the respondent continued, bid prices should then be 
properly classified as proprietary information and be withheld from becoming public knowledge. 
Otherwise, a contractor's cost data will become known by its competitors. 
With the correct understanding that a contractor's bid price include a margin of profit, 
contractors would be assured of an acceptable level of profit. Additionally, since specific cost 
elements are indeterminable through the analysis of bid prices, bid prices should not be 
considered proprietary information. 
Question 4: Do you believe that the Second Price Solicitation (SPSB) Method 
lessens administrative requirements for contractors? 
One-third of the Government contracting professionals believed there would be a slight 
lessening in contractors' administrative requirements. In sharp contrast, the vast majority of 
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private industry respondents indicated that there would be no change, or an increase, in their 
administrative requirements. 
In general, most of the respondents (both Government and private industry) thought there 
would be no change, or an increase, in contractors' administrative requirements for the following 
reasons. 
• Contractors would still be required to accumulate and analyze their costs which 
represents a majority of the effort in forecasting expected costs necessary in setting a 
price. 
• Contractors would still be required to monitor competitors' pricing strategies in order 
to formulate any counter-pricing strategies. 
• Contractors would need to accumulate historical profit data/trends in order to make 
informed decisions concerning a return on investment for future commercial and 
Government contracts. 
Another respondent indicated that when companies begin bidding at cost, higher 
management approval/scrutiny would also be required which would increase the administrative 
requirements on behalf of the contractors. 
Question 5: Do you believe that the Second Price Solicitation (SPSB) Method 
lessens administrative requirements for the Government? 
Roughly one-quarter of both Government and private industry contracting professionals 
indicated that there would be a small decrease in Government administrative requirements. 
Similar to the responses in the previous question, the majority of respondents believed 
there would be no change, or an increase, in administrative requirements for the following 
reasons. 
• The Government would need to determine price reasonableness for both the lowest and 
second lowest bidders. 
• The Government would continue to conduct market research necessary in determining 
that prospective contractors are responsive and responsible. 
Additionally, many respondents thought that the SPSB method would generate 
additional claims and protests, thereby causing an increase in managing litigation matters. 
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Accordingly, this would impact on administrative requirements for both Government and private 
industry. 
Question 6: Do you believe that the Second Price Solicitation (SPSB) Method 
would increase or decrease competition? 
Three percent of the private industry respondents and almost seventeen percent of the 
Government respondents believed there would be an increase in competition. In considering this 
difference, one might agree more with private industry's response that there would be little, if 
any, increase in competition when implementing the SPSB method. After all, private industry 
determines who competes for an award, not Government. 
Almost half of all respondents (Government and private industry) believed there would 
be no change in competition with the introduction of the SPSB method. As mentioned earlier in 
this chapter, one might conclude from this response that those believing a change in competition 
would not occur would also believe that contractors would be willing to participate in SPSB 
solicitations. 
Slightly over half of the private industry respondents and one-quarter of the Government 
respondents thought that competition would actually decrease. Both Government and private 
industry respondents agreed that uncertainties in profit would force contractors to invest into 
commercial ventures, vice Government. As was succinctly quoted from one of the respondents, 
"America's enterprise system relies on the profit motive..." Without this, there is no incentive 
for contractors to compete for Government contracts. 
Question 7: Would you be interested in obtaining additional information 
concerning the Second Price Solicitation (SPSB) Method? 
As was mentioned previously in this chapter, this question was posed to determine the 
level of respondents' ongoing interest in the SPSB method. Accordingly, 68.75 percent of 
private industry respondents and 54.4 percent of Government respondents were not interested in 
receiving additional information on the SPSB method. Furthermore, 31.25 percent of private 
industry respondents and 41.1 percent of Government respondents were interested. 
Accordingly, the overall conclusion is that the majority (i.e., over half) of all respondents 
would not be interested in the SPSB method. 
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Additional comments 
Several additional comments were provided by both Government and private industry 
contracting professionals. Overall, these comments did not support implementation of the SPSB 
method for reasons previously stated (i.e., uncertainties in profit and expected increases in game 
playing). 
Additional comments addressed the lack of attaining award prices that would be 
considered fair and reasonable by both Government and private industry. As was further stated, 
awarding a contract at a price which is determined by a third party (i.e., the next lowest bidder) 
"does not assure the Government or private industry that the final award price is fair and 
reasonable." As was repeatedly shown in this chapter, regardless of the next lowest bid price, 
winning contractors are assured a fair and reasonable price by way of including a margin of profit 
in their bid price. 
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V. CONCLUDING OBSERVATIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
To provide a conclusion with recommendations, the research questions posed in Chapter 
I will be presented and discussed. In addressing each of the primary and subsidiary research 
questions, the SPSB method described in Chapter II, findings based on experimentation 
conducted in Chapter III, and information obtained through the survey in Chapter IV will all be 
discussed. Following this presentation, recommendations and further areas of research will be 
provided regarding the application of the Second Price Sealed Bid (SPSB) method in 
Government contracting. 
A. SPSB RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
As presented in Chapter I, the primary research question was: Should the SPSB method 
be applied in the solicitation of Government contracts? Prior to providing an answer to this 
question, each subsidiary question will be addressed. 
1. Subsidiary Questions - Discussion 
a. Subsidiary Question 1 
What is the SPSB method as it pertains to Government contracting? As was 
discussed in Chapter II, the SPSB method is a method used in contracting where, in a Firm-Fixed 
Price (FFP) type contract, the award of a contract is given to the lowest bidder who is paid the 
next lowest bid price.    Accordingly, under sealed bidding, the criteria presented in Chapter II 
must be present (e.g., there must be adequate competition, price can be used as an adequate basis 
for determining award, etc.). Additionally, as a form of sealed bidding, the SPSB method 
consists of a rigidly structured contracting process, where each step is carefully executed to 
ensure equitable treatment of bidders while allowing the Government to make an award in a 
consistent and logical manner. As reiterated from Chapter II, the steps in sealed bidding were 
presented in the following manner: 
• the sealed bid solicitation for an FFP type contract is prepared and publicly announced 
through various methods (i.e., displaying in public places, mailing or delivery to 
13
   As used here, we assume that the winning bidder is found to be both responsive and responsible. 
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prospective contractors, or advertising in newspapers, trade journals or Government 
publications such as the Commerce Business Daily), 
• bids are prepared and received from prospective contractors and held, unopened, by the 
Government, 
• bids are then opened by Government officials in a public forum at an appointed time as 
specified in the solicitation for bid (at this time all contractors and their respective bids 
are publicly known), 
• and award is made to the responsible contractor whose bid is considered most 
advantageous to the Government (i.e., the contractor that reflects the lowest price and 
can accomplish the requirements of the solicitation is awarded the contract). 
In accordance with the SPSB method, the winning bidder is then paid a price 
reflected by the next lowest bidder. 
b. Subsidiary Question 2 
Why should the SPSB method be adopted by DoD? As was delineated in 
Chapter II, theoretically, contractors are incentivized to set their bid price equal to their true cost. 
As experimentation proved in Chapter III, bidding in this manner maximized contractors' 
opportunity to win an award in a profitable position. Consequently, the theoretical advantages 
were presented as follows: 
1. Costly and time intensive Government administrative requirements (e.g., various 
administrative requirements involved in PALT) would be eliminated. As a prime 
example, by knowing what contractors' true costs are (where bid prices are set to true 
costs), market surveys used in determining price reasonableness would become 
unnecessary. 
2. The most cost efficient contractor will always win the award. The Government is 
assured that the contractor receiving the award exercises the most cost efficient 
practices relative to its competitors. 
3. Contractors are incentivized to expedite implementation of cost efficient practices. 
The quicker a contractor can lower the cost of performance, the greater the profits 
that will be earned because the winning contractor will continue to be paid the next 
lowest bid price. 
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4. Contractors are spared the additional time and expense necessary in compiling profit 
data necessary in developing a competitive bid price. Under the SPSB method, bid 
prices will always be set equal to the true cost to perform. 
5. Competition may be stimulated. The simplicity in bid price setting (i.e., setting bid 
price equal to true cost) may attract prospective contractors in engaging in business 
with the Government. 
As presented below in Subsidiary Question 3, these theoretical assumptions will 
be compared with test results and survey responses discussed in Chapters III and IV. 
c. Subsidiary Question 3 
Would the SPSB method be an accepted form of solicitation of contracts by 
Government and/or private industry? In answering this question, each of the theoretical 
advantages will be listed and compared with testing results reflected in Chapter III and survey 
responses provided in Chapter IV. Accordingly, 
Theoretical Advantage 1. Costly and time intensive Government administrative 
requirements (e.g., various administrative requirements involved in PALT) would be eliminated. 
As a prime example, by knowing what contractors' true costs are (where bid prices are set to 
true costs), market surveys used in determining price reasonableness would become unnecessary. 
As was repeatedly expressed in the survey responses discussed in Chapter IV, 
the vast majority of both Government and private industry respondents believed that the 
implementation of the SPSB method would either have no change, or increase, Government 
administrative requirements for the following reasons: 
• The Government would need to determine price reasonableness for both the lowest and 
second lowest bidder. 
• The Government would continue to conduct market research necessary in determining 
that prospective contractors are responsive and responsible. 
• The Government would realize an increase in claims and protests, thereby causing an 
increase in the administration required in managing litigation matters. 
The conclusion, therefore, is the likely outcome that there would be no change in 
Government administrative requirements until the SPSB method is better understood. 
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Theoretical Advantage 2. The most cost efficient contractor will always win 
the award.  The Government is assured that the contractor receiving the award exercises the 
most cost efficient practices relative to its competitors. 
Chapter III addressed this issue through experimentation. Accordingly, it was 
determined that this advantage would become more prevalent as contractors become educated in 
the SPSB method. 
Theoretical Advantage 3. Contractors are incentivized to expedite 
implementation of cost efficient practices.  The quicker a contractor can lower the cost of 
performance, the greater the profits that will be earned because the winning contractor will 
continue be paid the next lowest bid price. 
Although this advantage was not specifically addressed in experimentation or 
through the survey, in a competitive market, contractors continually strive to improve production 
efficiencies to lower the cost of their product, thereby becoming more competitive and profitable. 
Under the SPSB method, contractors that are able to reduce costs quicker than their competitors 
are able to bid a lower price and improve their chances of earning higher profits (i.e., while 
decreasing their costs, they would still be paid the next lowest bid price offered by a competitor). 
Theoretical Advantage 4. Contractors are spared the additional time and 
expense necessary in compiling profit data necessary in developing a competitive bid price. 
Under the SPSB method, bid prices will always be set equal to the true cost to perform. 
As was repeatedly expressed in the survey responses discussed in Chapter IV, 
most Government and private industry respondents believed that the implementation of the SPSB 
method would either have no change, or increase, private industry administrative requirements 
for the following reasons: 
• Contractors would still be required to accumulate and analyze their costs which 
represents a majority of the effort in forecasting expected costs necessary in setting a 
price. 
• Contractors would still be required to monitor competitors' pricing strategies in order 
to formulate any counter-pricing strategies. 
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• Contractors would need to accumulate historical profit data/trends in order to make 
informed decisions concerning a return on investment for future commercial and 
Government contracts. 
• Contractors would increase the review/approval process by higher management when 
setting bid prices at cost. 
Theoretical Advantage 5. Competition may be stimulated.  The simplicity in 
bid price setting (i.e., setting bid price equal to true cost) may attract prospective contractors in 
engaging in business with the Government. 
As reflected in both Government and private industry survey responses found in 
Chapter IV, most respondents believed that competition would either not change, or decrease, 
with the implementation of the SPSB method. Their belief was primarily based on the 
uncertainties in profits that would be expected under the SPSB method. In fact, half of the 
private industry respondents indicated that there would be a decrease in competition because 
commercial ventures would become more lucrative than with Government contracts. 
d. Subsidiary Question 4 
What impediments exist that would preclude the application of the SPSB method 
in Government Contracting? 
The primary impediment in applying the SPSB method to Government 
contracting is the unwillingness expressed by both Government and private industry contracting 
professionals. Accordingly, in Chapter IV, the majority of both Government and private industry 
respondents stated that they were either uncertain, or not willing, to participate in SPSB 
solicitations because of 1) their unfamiliarity with the SPSB method, 2) lack of assurances of 
earning an acceptable level of profit, and 3) artificial rules created under the SPSB method which 
intensifies game playing. Additionally, there were also legal issues regarding the implementation 
of the SPSB method. For example, when bidding under the theory of the SPSB method, bid 
prices submitted theoretically represent a contractor's cost (i.e., their bid price should equal their 
cost). Under this situation, a concern was raised in that these bid prices should be classified as 
proprietary information. Additionally, other respondents believed that the SPSB method would 
be fraught with claims and protests. 
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As was repeatedly discussed throughout Chapter IV, both Government and 
private industry respondents grossly misunderstood that profit was not included in a contractor's 
bid price. Accordingly, a margin of profit should be reflected in a contractor's bid price. When 
developing a bid price, contractors should include all relevant cost, to include, for example, a 
minimal rate of return (or profit) that reflects corporate profit policy. 
2. Primary Question - Discussion 
Should the SPSB method be applied in the solicitation of Government contracts? 
Given the overwhelming evidence found in the Chapter IV survey of Government and 
private industry contracting professionals, one would be inclined not to support the SPSB 
method. After careful consideration, "cultural" uncertainties exist with the SPSB method which 
strongly indicates a resistance to change. By far, the greatest impediment perceived by both 
Government and private industry contracting professionals is the lack of assurances that an award 
price under the SPSB method results in an acceptable rate of return for contractors, and that this 
SPSB price represents a fair and reasonable price for both Government and private industry. 
Respondents to the Chapter IV survey clearly expressed concerns that a price set by a third party 
(i.e., the next lowest bid price) could not guarantee a fair and reasonable price, nor represent a 
return on investment that is acceptable to contractors' interests (e.g., a return on investment that 
satisfies stockholders' desires). However, this thesis clearly identifies the misconceptions 
regarding the SPSB method on behalf of both Government and private industry. With the 
complete understanding that SPSB prices should include a margin of profit, both Government 
and private industry respondents would increase the likelihood of accepting the SPSB method. 
This speculation is based on the fact that contractors would include a margin of profit in their bid 
prices that would be considered fair and reasonable. Consequently, one would also expect 
competition not to decrease with the implementation of the SPSB method. 
Accordingly, the recommendation of this thesis is to further educate Government and 
private industry regarding their misconceptions of the SPSB method. With a full understanding 
of the critical issues/shortfalls discussed in this thesis, future application of the SPSB method in 
Government contracting appears promising. 
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B. AREAS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH 
There have been various aspects of this thesis that would warrant additional research. 
Accordingly, they are as follows: 
• The two experimental approaches and the survey discussed in this thesis did not fully 
address the concept of "cost of profit" as defined in the economic sense where a 
contractor's true cost should include a margin of profit. As such, a contractor's bid 
price should reflect a profit "cost" element which would assure contractors a fair and 
reasonable award price. Accordingly, future experiments and surveys would be 
recommended that fully identify this concept. Accordingly, these results should prove 
more revealing than what was presented in this thesis. 
• Although not related to contracting, additional research has been completed in second- 
price theory by David Porter of the California Institute of Technology which was not 
included in this thesis. Further research in the SPSB method should include his work 
as it applies to contracting. 
C. FINAL THOUGHTS 
Although the findings of this thesis are somewhat discouraging for those supporting the 
SPSB method, there are several avenues for further research that may eventually manifest itself 
in one form or another in Government contracting. In retrospect to the findings of this thesis, 
one must recognize that second-pricing and the SPSB method were relatively new concepts for 
both the graduate students who participated in the experimentation discussed in Chapter III and 
the respondents of the Chapter IV survey. Perhaps, after further experimentation, exposure, and 
education in second-price theory, these individuals may be more inclined to accept this 
innovative concept and encourage its application in future Government contracting. After all, 
Rome was not built in a day. 
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APPENDIX A. A LIST OF GOVERNMENT AND INDUSTRY SURVEYED 
Defense Commissary Agency 
East Service Agency 
Attn: Contracting Division 
Fort Lee, VA 23801-6300 
Defense Commissary Agency 
Southwest Region 
Attn: Contracting Division 
MCASElToro Building 317 
Santa Ana, CA 92709-5002 
Defense Commissary Agency 
Northeast Region 
Attn: Contracting Division 
FortMeade, MD 20755-5220 
Defense Commissary Agency 
Northwest Region 
Attn: Contracting Division 
Fort Lewis, WA 98443-7300 
Defense Commissary Agency 
West Service Division 
Atta: Contracting Division 
Kelly AFB, TX 78241-6290 
Defense Commissary Agency 
Midwest Region 
Atta: Contracting Division 
Kelly AFB, TX 78241-6290 
Defense Commissary Agency 
Southern Region 
Attn: Contracting Division 
Maxwell AFB, AL 36112-6722 
Defense Commissary Agency 
Central Region 
Atta: Contracting Division 
Naval Amphibious Base, Norfolk, VA 23511 
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U.S. Army Information System Selection and Acquisition Agency 
Hoffman I Bldg. 
Atta: SADBU 
2461 Eisenhower Ave. 
Alexandria, VA 22331-0700 
Naval Regional Contracting Center 
Atta: Deputy for Small Business, Code OB, 
Bldg. 53, Terminal Island 
Long Beach, CA 90822-5095 
Air Force Communication Center 
Scott Air Force Base 
Atta: Small Business Specialist 
Belleville, IL 62225-6001 
Defense Logistics Agency 
Office of Telecommunications and Information Systems 
ADP Contracting Division 
Cameron Station, Alexandria, VA 22304-6100 
Naval Regional Contracting Center Code 01 
4th Floor, Building 200 
Washington Navy Yard 
Washington, DC 20374-2000 
Commander 
Defense Supply Service Washington 
Rm. 1D254 
The Pentagon 
Washington, DC 20310-5200 
Commander 
Space and Naval Warfare Systems Command 
Code SPAWAR-OOK 
Washington, DC 20363-5100 
Commander 
Naval Sea Systems Command 
Code 02K 
Crystal Park #1, Room 1102 
Washington, DC 20362-5101 
Commander 
Naval Regional Contracting Center 
Code 09B, 
U.S. Naval Base, Bldg. 600 
Philadelphia, PA 19112-5802 
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Commander 
Navy Aviation Supply Office 
Code 093 
700 Robbins Avenue 
Philadelphia, PA 19111-5098 
Commander 
Navy Ships Parts Control Center 
Code 006 
P.O. Box 2020, 
Mechanicsburg, PA 17055-0788 
Commander 
Mare Island Naval Shipyard 
Code 533 
Supply Department 
Vallejo, CA 94592-5100 
Commander 
Pearl Harbor Naval Shipyard 
Code 530 
Box 400 
Pearl Harbor, HI 96860-7300 
Commander 
Portsmouth Naval Shipyard 
Code 530 
Bldg. 153, Room 15 
Portsmouth, NH 03801-2590 
Commander 
Philadelphia Naval Shipyard 
Code 500.03 
U.S. Naval Base 
Philadelphia, PA 19112 
Commander 
Norfolk Naval Shipyard 
Code 500S 
Bldg. 1500 
Portsmouth, VA 23709-5000 
Commander 
Naval Submarine Base New London 
Code 244.4, Box 500 
Bldg. 87-2 
Groton, CT 06349-5000 
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Commander 
Naval Air Engineering Center 
Code OOM, Bldg. 129 
Lakehurst, N.J. 08733-5028 
Commander 
Naval Air Development Center 
Code 094 
Warminster, PA 18974-5000 
Commander 
Naval Weapons Center 
Code 2503 
China Lake, CA 93555-6001 
Commander 
Navy Resale and Services Support Office 
Naval Station Staten Island 
Code CGR 
Bldg. 210 
Staten Island, NY 10305-5097 
Commander, Northern Division 
Naval Facilities Engineering Command,Code 09J 
Bldg. 77L 
Naval Base 
Philadelphia, PA 19112 
Commander, Chesapeake Division 
Naval Facilities Engineering Command, Code 09J 
Bldg. 212 
Washington Navy Yard 
Washington, DC 20374-2121 
Commander, Atlantic Division 
Naval Facilities Engineering Command, Code 09J 
Norfolk Naval Base, Norfolk, VA 23511-6287 
Commander, Southern Division 
Naval Facilities Engineering Command, Code 09J, 
P.O. Box 10068 
Charleston, SC 29411-0068 
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Commander, Western Division 
Naval Facilities Engineering Command, Code 09J 
900 Commondore Drive 
P.O. Box 727 
San Bruno, CA 94066-0720 
Commander, Pacific Division 
Naval Facilities Engineering Command, Code 09J 
Pearl Harbor, HI 96860 
DCMAO Baltimore 
200 Townsontown Blvd. West 
Townson, MD 21204-5229 
DCMAO Dayton 
1507 Wilmington Pike 
Bldg. No. 1 
Dayton, OH 45444-5300 
DCMAO Philadelphia 
2800 South 20th Street 
P.O. Box 7478 
Philadelphia, PA 19101-7478 
DCMAO Bridgeport 
555 Lordship Blvd. 
Bridgeport, CT 06497-7124 
DCMAO Buffalo 
1103 Federal Building 
111 West Huron Street 
Buffalo, NY 14202-2392 
DCMAO Garden City 
605 Stewart Avenue 
Long Island, NY 11530-4761 
DCMAO Birmingham 
2121 8th Avenue, North 
Suite 104 
Birmingham, AL 35203-2376 
DCMAO Dallas 
1200 Main Street 
Dallas, TX 75202-9205 
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DCMAO Hartford 
130 Darlin Street 
East Hartford, CT 06108-3234 
DCMAO Boston 
495 Summer Street 
Boston, MA 02210-2184 
DCMAO Syracuse 
615 Erie Blvd., West 
Syracuse, NY 13204-2408 
DCMAO New York 
201 Varick Street 
Room 1061 
New York, NY 10014-4811 
DCMAO San Antonio 
615 East Houston Street 
P.O. Box 1040 
San Antonio, TX 78294-1040 
DCMAO Pittsburgh 
1612 Federal Building 
1000 Liberty Avenue 
Pittsburgh, PA 15222-4190 
DCMAO Detroit 
905 McNamara Federal Building 
477 Michigan Avenue, 
Detroit, MI 48226-2506 
DCMAO Cleveland 
AJC Federal Office Building 
1240 East Ninth Street 
Room 1431 
Cleveland, OH 44199-2064 
DCMAO Philadelphia 
2800 South 20th Street 
P.O. Box 7699 
Philadelphia, PA 19101-7699 
DCMAO Reading 
45 South Front Street 
Reading, PA 19602-1094 
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DCMAO Denver 
Orchard Place 2, Suite 2 
5975 Greenwood Plaza Blvd. 
Englewood, CO 80111-4715 
DCMAO Indianapolis 
Finance Center 
US Army, Building 1 
Ft Benjamin Harrison 46249-5701 
DCMAO Chicago 
O'Hare International Airport 
P.O. Box 66911 
Chicago, IL 60666-0911 
DCMAO Cedar Rapids 
1231 Park Place NE 
Cedar Rapids, IA 49504-5352 
DCMAO Wichita 
U.S. Court House 
401 N. Market 
Suite B34 
Wichita, KS 67202-2095 
DCMAO Grand Rapids 
Riverview Center Building 
678 Front Street, NW 
Grand Rapids, MI 49504-5352 
DCMAO St. Louis 
1222 Spruce Street 
St. Louis, MO 63103-2811 
DCMAO Twin Cities 
3001 Metro Drive 
Bloomington, NM 55425-1911 
DCMAO Milwaukee 
310 West Wisconsin Avenue 
Milwaukee, WI 53203-2216 
DCMAO El Segundo 
222 N. Sepulveda Boulevard 
El Segundo, CA 90245-4320 
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DCMAO Van Nuys 
6230 Van Nuys Blvd. 
Van Nuys, CA 91401-2713 
DCMAO Santa Ana 
34 Civic Center Plaza 
P.O. BoxC-12700 
Santa Ana, CA 92712-2700 
DCMAO San Diego 
7675 Dogget Street 
Suite 200 
San Diego, CA 92111-2241 
DCMAO San Francisico 
1250 Bay Hill Drive 
San Bruno, CA 94066-3070 
DCMAO Seattle 
Building 5D 
Naval Station Puget Sound 
Seattle, WA 98115-5010 
DPRO Pratt and Whitney East Hartford 
400 Main Street 
East Hartford, CT 06108-0969 
DPRO General Electric 
Aircraft Engines, Lynn 
1000 Western Avenue 
Lynn, MA 01910-0445 
DPRO Boeing Helicopter 
P.O. Box 16859 
Philadelphia, PA 19142-0859 
DPRO Westinghouse Baltimore 
P.O. Box 1693 
MS 1285 
Baltimore, MD 21203-1693 
DPRO Texas Instruments 
P.O. Box 660246 
MS 256 
Dallas, TX 75266-0246 
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Mr. Jodie Cowley 
Ball Corporation 
Space Systems Division 
P.O. Box 1062 
Boulder, CO 80306 
Mr. Matthew E. Brislawn, Vice President of Contracts 
Defense & Space Group 
M/S 80-PF 
P.O. Box 3999 
Seatüe, WA 98124 
Mr. Bill Burnett, Director of Contracts 
Chrysler Technologies Corporation 
Electrospace Systems Inc. 
1301 East Collins Blvd. 
Richardson, TX 75081 
Mr. Tom Miller, Director of Contracts 
Cincinnati Electronics Corporation 
7500 Innovation Way 
Mason, OH 45040-9699 
Mr. David Armstrong 
Eastman Chemical Company 
P.O. Box 511 
Kingsport, TN 37662 
Ms. Marie Scott 
ENSERCH Environmental Corporation 
1290 Wallstreet West, 5th Floor 
Lynhurst, NJ 07071 
Ms. Darice Jamison, Contract Specialist 
ENSERCH Environmental Corporation 
145 Technology Park 
Norcross, GA 30092-2979 
Mr. Jerry 
Ground System Division 
P.O. Box 367 
San Jose, CA 95103 
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Mr. J. F. Garred 
Martin Marietta Astronautics 
P.O. Box 179 
M/S DC 2400 
Denver, CO 80201 
Mr. Joe Janscak, Manager of Contracts 
Martin Marietta Government Electronics Systems 
M/S 137-107 
Marne Highway 
Moorestown, NJ 08057 
Mr. John McGowan 
Hewlett-Packard Company 
5301 Stevens Creek Blvd. 
Santa Clara, CA 95052-8059 




Albuquerque, NM 87113-2227 
Ms. Christine Carlin 
Room 39-216 
T. J. Watson Research Center 
Route 134 
Yorktown Heights, New York, NY 10598 
ITT Pomona Electronics 
Atta: Mr. John Yvanovich 
1500 East 9th Street 
Pomona, CA 91766-3835 
Ms. Esther Wilcox, Vice President and Director of Contracts 
ITT Gilfillan 
M/S 14 
P.O. Box 7713 
VanNuys, CA 91409 
Lockheed Corporation 
Mr. Bill Surls 
Department 88-70 Zone 0290 
86 South Cobb Drive 
Marietta, GA 30063 
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Mr. John Ferguson 
Director Contracts and Pricing 
McDonnell Douglas Aerospace 
1510 Hughes Way 
217B-441 
Long Beach, CA 90810-1870 
Mr. David Wolfe 
Motorola GSTG 
8201 East McDowell Road 
Scottsdale, AZ 85257 
Mr. Randy Lyon, Director Contract Department 
Vitro Corporation 
45 West Gude Drive 
Rockville,MD 20850-1160 
Mr. Shay Assad, Vice President of Contracts 
Raytheon Company 
141 Spring Street 
Lexington, MA 02173 
Mr. K. A. Main 
Associate Council and Director of Contracts 
Rolls-Royce, Inc. 
2849 Paces Ferry Road 
Suite 400 
Atlanta, GA 30339 
Mr. C. Punte, Director Contracts Management 
Sequa Corporation 
MS: CONTR-1 
220 Daniel Webster Highway 
Merrimack,NH 03054 
Mr. James Christy, Vice President Government Relations 
TRW Incorporated 
1001 19th Street North 
Suite 800 
Arlington, VA 22209 
Ms. Perry Holt 
Teledyne Incorporated 
2111 Wilson Blvd. 
Suite 1100 
Arlington, VA 22201 
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Mr. Roger Israelson 
Texas Instruments Incorporated 
2501 South Highway 121 
P.O. Box 405 
M/S: 3409 
Lewisville, TX 75067 
Mr. Joel Marsh, Director Acquisition Policy 
United Technologies Corporation 
Suite 600 
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Washington, DC 20005 
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TRACOR Aerospace, Inc. 
MS 28-14 
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APPENDIX B. SURVEY QUESTIONS WITH COVER SHEETS 
SURVEY OF THE SECOND PRICE SOLICITATION METHOD 
This survey is designed to elicit professional contract management opinions as they pertain to the 
solicitation of Firm-Fixed type contracts (sealed bid) under $100,000 using the Second Price 
Solicitation Method. This survey is being presented to both contractors and various Government 
contracting officials to provide differing perspectives on the application of this solicitation 
method. 
What is the Second Price Solicitation Method? In contrast with the commonly used First 
Price Solicitation Method used in soliciting Firm-Fixed (sealed bid) type contracts, where the 
lowest bidder is awarded the contract and paid the amount of their bid, the Second Price 
Solicitation Method awards the contract to the lowest bidder and is paid the amount of the next- 
to-lowest bid. Theoretically, in a competitive environment, contractors' best long-term strategy 
for submitting bids under the Second Price Solicitation Method is to bid their actual costs for the 
following reasons, 
1) bidding higher than their actual costs increases the risk of not being the lowest 
bidder, therefore losing the award and, 
2) bidding lower than their actual costs increases the risk of being awarded a contract in 
an unprofitable position (this would occur where the next-to-lowest bid is also lower than their 
actual costs). 
Continuing with this theory, contractors would then accumulate their actual costs and bid this 
sum without expending management efforts in formulating a pricing strategy (i.e., management 
would not have to expend administrative efforts in determining a competitive profit position). 
Accordingly, market surveys and audits performed by the Government to determine price/cost 
reasonableness would become unnecessary. Free market competitive forces between contractors 
would disclose their actual costs as reflected in their bids. 
As a final note, the Second Price Solicitation Method is an alternative contract solicitation 
method that is being analyzed under the umbrella of "Reinventing Government." Although this 
method is currently not supported by statute or regulation, this survey assumes that it is 
supported by law and your responses should take this under consideration. 
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SECTION I: RESPONDENT BACKGROUND AND EXPERIENCE 
Al. Select the answer(s) that most nearly describes your position in your present organization: 
a. Government contracts management that either formulates, issues, or audits 
Government contract policy. 
b. Government contracting specialist (e.g., those individuals who either drafts, 
solicits, awards contracts or performs post-contract administration). 
d. Non-Government contracts management (i.e., senior/executive management). 
e. Non-Government contracting specialist (e.g., those individuals who either 
drafts, solicits, awards contracts or prepares bid proposals) 
f. Other, please specify: _■ 
A2. How many years experience have you in the procurement/contracting field? 
a.  1 year or less b. 1 to 3 years c. 3 to 5 years 
d. 5 to 10 years e. Over 10 years 
A3. How many years have you been directly involved with Firm-Fixed type contracting? 
a.  1 year or less b.  1 to 3 years c. 3 to 5 years 
d. 5 to 10 years e. Over 10 years 
A4. For non-Government contractors, your company is considered: 
a. Small business 
b. Large business. 
SECTION II: SECOND PRICE SOLICITATION SURVEY QUESTIONS 
B1. Have you ever been exposed to the Second Price Solicitation Method? 
a. Yes. 
b. No. 
If yes, please elaborate:  . .  
B2. If allowed by law, would you as a buyer consider soliciting a Firm-Fixed (sealed bid) type 
contract using the Second Price Solicitation Method? 
a. Yes, definitely. 
b. Yes, with reservations. 
c. Neutral/uncertain. 
d. No. 
If no or neutral, please elaborate:  . 
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B3. To be answered by Non-Government: If allowed by law, would you as a seller consider 
submitting a bid for a Firm-Fixed (sealed bid) type contract using the Second Price Solicitation 
Method? 
a. Yes, definitely. 
b. Yes, with reservations. 
c. Neutral/uncertain. 
d. No. 
If no or neutral, please elaborate:  
B4. Do you believe that the Second Price Solicitation Method lessens administrative 
requirements for contractors? 
a. Yes, extensively. 
b. Yes, to a small extent. 
c. No. 
If no, please elaborate:  
B5. Do you believe that the Second Price Solicitation Method lessens administrative 
requirements for the Government? 
a. Yes, extensively. 
b. Yes, to a small extent. 
c. No. 
If no, please elaborate:  
B6. Do you believe that the Second Price Solicitation Method would increase or decrease 
competition? 
a. Definite increase. 
b. Probable increase. 
c. No increase/decrease. 
d. Probable decrease. 
e. Definite decrease. 





B8. Please comment on any aspect of the Second Price Solicitation Method you feel is 
noteworthy. Thank you for your participation. 
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APPENDIX C. EXPERIMENTS 1 - 4/PHASES I & H 
EXPERIMENT 1 - PHASE I 
First Price & Second Price (Sealed Bid) Solicitations 
Definition 
First Price Sealed Bid Solicitation - Award goes to the lowest bidder and is paid the 
amount of their bid. 
Second Price Sealed Bid Solicitation - Award goes to the lowest bidder and is paid the 
amount of the next to lowest bid. 
1. Your company is a manufacturer of various electronic components and is considering 
to bid on a Government solicitation for 10 infrared sensors: 
a. Your company's total cost (i.e., labor, material, and overhead costs) to 
manufacture ten infrared sensors is $(a random generated cost-to-manufacture figure in 
the range of $9.00-1.100 for each group is inserted here). 
b. The technology required to manufacture the sensors is relatively mature with 
an average industry-wide cost to manufacture ten sensors at $1,000. Historically, the 
electronics industry earned an average of 8% profit in the sale of infrared sensors. 
Accordingly, the average industry-wide price for ten infrared sensors is $1,080 ($1,000 + 
1,000*8% = $1,080). 
c. The economy is steadily growing and there is expected to be in excess of 10 
competitors submitting bids for this solicitation. 
2. Required: 
a. Provide a bid under the terms of a First Price Sealed Bid Solicitation with 
rationale for your pricing strategy. 
b. Provide a bid under the terms of a Second Price Sealed Bid Solicitation with 
rationale for your pricing strategy. 
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EXPERIMENT 1 - PHASE H 
First Price & Second Price (Sealed Bid) Solicitations 
Definition 
First Price Sealed Bid Solicitation - Award goes to the lowest bidder and is paid the 
amount of their bid. 
Second Price Sealed Bid Solicitation - Award goes to the lowest bidder and is paid the 
amount of the next to lowest bid. 
1. Your company is a manufacturer of various electronic components and is considering 
to bid on a Government solicitation for 10 microprocessors for the AEMS-9X missile 
system: 
a. Your company's total cost (i.e., labor, material, and overhead costs) to 
manufacture ten microprocessors is $fa random generated cost-to-manufacture figure in 
the ranee of $8.000-12.000 for each group is inserted here). 
b. The technology required to manufacture the microprocessors is state-of-the- 
art. Accordingly, obtaining market survey information is not available to predict your 
competitors' bid proposals. 
c. In general, the electronics industry earns an average of 12% profit in the sale 
of microprocessors. 
d. The economy is steadily growing and there is expected to be in excess of 10 
competitors submitting bids for this solicitation. 
2. Required: 
a. Provide a bid under the terms of a First Price Sealed Bid Solicitation with 
rationale for your pricing strategy. 
b. Provide a bid under the terms of a Second Price Sealed Bid Solicitation with 
rationale for your pricing strategy. 
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EXPERIMENT 2 - PHASE I 
First Price & Second Price (Sealed Bid) Solicitations 
Definition 
First Price Sealed Bid Solicitation - Award goes to the lowest bidder and is paid the 
amount of their bid. 
Second Price Sealed Bid Solicitation - Award goes to the lowest bidder and is paid the 
amount of the next to lowest bid. 
1. Your company is a manufacturer of various electronic components and is considering 
to bid on a Government solicitation for 10 infrared sensors: 
a. Your company's total cost (i.e., labor, material, and overhead costs) to 
manufacture ten infrared sensors is $(a random generated cost-to-manufacture figure in 
the range of $9.000-11.000 for each group is inserted here). 
b. The technology required to manufacture the sensors is relatively mature with 
an industry-wide average cost to manufacture ten sensors at $10,000. Historically, the 
electronics industry earned an average of 8% profit in the sale of infrared sensors. 
Accordingly, the average price requested for the infrared sensor is $10,800 ($10,000 + 
10,000*8% = $10,800). 
c. The economy is steadily growing and there is expected to be in excess of 10 
competitors submitting bids for this solicitation. 
2. Required: 
a. Provide a bid under the terms of a First Price Sealed Bid Solicitation with 
rationale for your pricing strategy. 
b. Provide a bid under the terms of a Second Price Sealed Bid Solicitation with 
rationale for your pricing strategy. 
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EXPERIMENT 2 - PHASE H 
First Price & Second Price (Sealed Bid) Solicitations 
Definition 
First Price Sealed Bid Solicitation - Award goes to the lowest bidder and is paid the 
amount of their bid. 
Second Price Sealed Bid Solicitation - Award goes to the lowest bidder and is paid the 
amount of the next to lowest bid. 
1. Your company is a manufacturer of various electronic components and is considering 
to bid on a Government solicitation for 10 microprocessors for the AEVIS-9X missile 
system: 
a. Your company's total cost (i.e., labor, material, and overhead costs) to 
manufacture ten microprocessors is $(a random generated cost-to-manufacture figure in 
the range of $3.000-7.000 for each group is inserted here). 
b. The technology required to manufacture the microprocessors is state-of-the- 
art. Accordingly, obtaining market survey information is not available to predict your 
competitors' bid proposals. 
c. In general, the electronics industry earns an average of 12% profit in the sale 
of microprocessors. 
d. The economy is steadily growing and there is expected to be in excess of 10 
competitors submitting bids for this solicitation. 
2. Required: 
a. Provide a bid under the terms of a First Price Sealed Bid Solicitation with 
rationale for your pricing strategy. 
b. Provide a bid under the terms of a Second Price Sealed Bid Solicitation with 
rationale for your pricing strategy. 
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EXPERIMENT 3 - PHASE I 
First Price & Second Price (Sealed Bid) Solicitations 
Definition 
First Price Sealed Bid Solicitation - Award goes to the lowest bidder and is paid the 
amount of their bid. 
Second Price Sealed Bid Solicitation - Award goes to the lowest bidder and is paid the 
amount of the next to lowest bid. 
1. Your company is a manufacturer of various electronic components and is considering 
to bid on a Government solicitation for 10 infrared sensors: 
a. Your company's total cost (i.e., labor, material, and overhead costs) to 
manufacture ten infrared sensors is $(a random generated cost-to-manufacture figure in 
the range of $9.00-1,100 for each group is inserted here). 
b. The technology required to manufacture the sensors is relatively mature with 
an average industry-wide cost to manufacture ten sensors at $1,000. Historically, the 
electronics industry earned an average of 8% profit in the sale of infrared sensors. 
Accordingly, the average industry-wide price for the infrared sensor is $1,080 ($1,000 + 
1,000*8% = $1,080). 
c. The economy is steadily growing and there is expected to be in excess of 10 
competitors submitting bids for this solicitation. 
2. Required: 
a. Provide a bid under the terms of a First Price Sealed Bid Solicitation with 
rationale for your pricing strategy. 
b. Provide a bid under the terms of a Second Price Sealed Bid Solicitation with 
rationale for your pricing strategy. 
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EXPERIMENT 3 - PHASE H 
First Price & Second Price (Sealed Bid) Solicitations 
Definition 
First Price Sealed Bid Solicitation - Award goes to the lowest bidder and is paid the 
amount of their bid. 
Second Price Sealed Bid Solicitation - Award goes to the lowest bidder and is paid the 
amount of the next to lowest bid. 
1. Your company is a manufacturer of various electronic components and is considering 
to bid on a Government solicitation for 10 microprocessors for the AEVIS-9X missile 
system: 
a. Your company's total cost (i.e., labor, material, and overhead costs) to 
manufacture ten microprocessors is $fa random generated cost-to-manufacture figure in 
the range of $8.000-12.000 for each group is inserted here). 
b. The technology required to manufacture the microprocessor is state-of-the-art. 
Accordingly, obtaining market survey information is not available to predict your 
competitors' bid proposals. 
c. In general, the electronics industry earns an average of 12% profit in the sale 
of microprocessors. 
d. The economy is steadily growing and there is expected to be in excess of 10 
competitors submitting bids for this solicitation. 
2. Required: 
a. Provide a bid under the terms of a First Price Sealed Bid Solicitation with 
rationale for your pricing strategy. 
b. Provide a bid under the terms of a Second Price Sealed Bid Solicitation with 
rationale for your pricing strategy. 
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EXPERIMENT 4 - PHASE I 
First Price & Second Price (Sealed Bid) Solicitations 
Definition 
First Price Sealed Bid Solicitation - Award goes to the lowest bidder and is paid the 
amount of their bid. 
Second Price Sealed Bid Solicitation - Award goes to the lowest bidder and is paid the 
amount of the next to lowest bid. 
1. Your company is a manufacturer of various electronic components and is considering 
to bid on a Government solicitation for 10 infrared sensors: 
a. Your company's total cost (i.e., labor, material, and overhead costs) to 
manufacture ten infrared sensors is $(a random generated cost-to-manufacture figure in 
the range of $9,000-11,000 for each group is inserted hereV 
b. The technology required to manufacture the sensors is relatively mature with a 
industry-wide average cost to manufacture ten sensors at $10,000. Historically, the 
electronics industry earned an average of 8% profit in the sale of infrared sensors. 
Accordingly, the average price requested for the infrared sensors is $10,800 ($10,000 + 
10,000*8% = $10,800). 
c. The economy is steadily growing and there is expected to be in excess of 10 
competitors submitting bids for this solicitation. 
2. Required: 
a. Provide a bid under the terms of a First Price Sealed Bid Solicitation with 
rationale for your pricing strategy. 
b. Provide a bid under the terms of a Second Price Sealed Bid Solicitation with 
rationale for your pricing strategy. 
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EXPERIMENT 4 - PHASE H 
First Price & Second Price (Sealed Bid) Solicitations 
Definition 
First Price Sealed Bid Solicitation - Award goes to the lowest bidder and is paid the 
amount of their bid. 
Second Price Sealed Bid Solicitation - Award goes to the lowest bidder and is paid the 
amount of the next to lowest bid. 
1. Your company is a manufacturer of various electronic components and is considering 
to bid on a Government solicitation for 10 microprocessors for the AEVIS-9X missile 
system: 
a. Your company's total cost (i.e., labor, material, and overhead costs) to 
manufacture ten microprocessors is $(a random generated cost-to-manufacture figure in 
the range of $3.000-7.000 for each group is inserted hereV 
b. The technology required to manufacture microprocessors is state-of-the-art. 
Accordingly, obtaining market survey information is not available to predict your 
competitors' bid proposals. 
c. In general, the electronics industry earns an average of 12% profit in the sale 
of microprocessors. 
d. The economy is steadily growing and there is expected to be in excess of 10 
competitors submitting bids for this solicitation. 
2. Required: 
a. Provide a bid under the terms of a First Price Sealed Bid Solicitation with 
rationale for your pricing strategy. 
b. Provide a bid under the terms of a Second Price Sealed Bid Solicitation with 
rationale for your pricing strategy. 
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APPENDIX D. RANDOM COST-TO-MANUFACTURE 
Appendix D is a listing of random cost-to-manufacture figures which were used in the 
classroom experimentation found in Chapter III. Accordingly, the Microsoft Excel Random 
Number Generator provided a uniform distribution within the ranges indicated below. 
Microsoft Excel 
Random Number Generation 
900-1,100 9,000-11,000 3,000-7,000 8,000-12,000 
1 913 10,760 4,780 8,021 
2 1,036 9,376 6,310 9,425 
3 1,073 10,691 4,350 9,820 
4 959 9,709 6,618 9,794 
5 963 9,422 3,813 11,445 
6 909 10,009 6,746 8,614 
7 1,081 9,968 4,858 8,219 
8 992 9,244 4,412 9,648 
9 904 10,030 6,206 9,899 
10 947 10,597 3,060 9,717 
11 1,025 10,817 4,971 11,992 
12 1,043 9,306 6,280 11,645 
13 907 10,643 5,832 8,239 
14 1,036 10,476 4,943 8,827 
15 966 9,687 3,708 10,867 
16 1,091 10,200 4,927 10,602 
17 1,070 10,398 5,293 8,039 
18 1,078 9,081 4,425 9,176 
19 907 10,733 3,456 9,305 
20 1,095 9,057 3,733 8,658 
21 906 10,091 4,827 10,300 
22 1,056 10,449 3,659 11,484 
23 1,030 9,580 3,15a 11,958 
24 1,015 10,813 3,715 9,413 
25 910 10,498 5,916 9,557 
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APPENDIX E. EXPERIMENTS 1 - 5, SECOND PRICE AUCTION 
jiRoundl 
l Group Value 
Experiment 1, Second Price Auction 
Round 2 
Bid      1 Strategy \                   \ Group \    Value Bid Strategy i 
1 9354 9354 — 1 7503 7503 — 
  
2 9789 10000 < 2 7865 7864 > 
3 9998 9950 > 3 8659 8639 > 
4 8915 6500 > 4 8135 8135 = 
5 9254 9255 < 5 8800 8850 < 
6 8562 6850 > 6 7286 6552 > 
7 9687 9600 > 7 7684 7700 < 
8 9543 9543 =- 8 7951 7960 < 
9 8264 8264 = 9 8256 8250 > 
10 8176 8000 > 10 8169 8100 > 
Group 2 Group 5 
Profit -161 % Var = 4.62 Profit 161 % Var = 0.94 
Round3 Round4 
Group Value Bid      i Strategy f                   j Group Value Bid Strategy 
1 6824 6824 
= 1 8930 8930 = 
2 6853 6800 > 2 8910 8910 
= 
3 6950 6945 > 3 8920 8920 
= 
4 6923 6923 = 4 8940 8940 
= 
5 6897 6900 < 5 8900 8901 < 
6 6975 6417 > 6 8960 8881 > 
1 6854 6954 < 7 8980 8980 
= 
8 6910 6920 < 8 9000 9010 < 
9 6875 6875 = 9 8970 8970 
= 
10 6798 6790 > 10 8950 8890 > 
Group 7 Group 8 
Profit -91 % Var = 0.74 Profit 20 % Var = 0.14 
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Experiment 2, Second Price Auction \ 
Round 1                                                                              ;Round2 
Group Value             Bid       j  Strategy \                     \ Group ;     Value             Bid       j   Strategy  i 
1 9354 9354 = 1 7503 7506 < 
2 9789 9790 < 2 7865 7866 < 
3 9998 55000 < 3 8659 100000 < 
4 8915 8915 = 4 8135 8253 < 
5 9254 9254 = 5 8800 8800 = 
6 8562 8562 = 6 7286 7286 = 
7 9687 16000 < 7 7684 7685 < 
  
8 9543 9600 < 8 7951 8025 < 
9 8264 8164 > 9 8256 18256 < 
10 8176 8176 = 10 8169 8169 = 
Croup 3 Group 3 
Profit -6,002 % Var = 56.01 Profit -9597 % Var = 126.44 
Round 3                                                                             |Round4 
\ Group j     Value             Bid       j  Strategy \                     \ Group \    Value             Bid       ;   Strategy 
-—- 
.,„.,.. 
1 6824 6890 < 1 8930 10000 < 
2 6853 6854 < 2 8910 8911 < 
3 6950 6950 = 3 8920 8920 = 
4 6923 7023 < 4 8940 9040 < 
5 6897 6897 = 5 8900 8900 = 
6 6975 6975 = 6 8960 8960 = 
7 6854 7000 < 7 8980 9000 < 
8 6910 6950 < 
-—4~— 8 9000 9105 
< 
9 6875 7200 < 9 8970 9170 < 
10 6798 6798 = 10 8950 8950 = 
Group 9 Group 1 
Profit -148 % Var = 0.98 Profit -240 % Var = 1.67 
i 
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Experiment 3, Second Price Auction] 
Round 1                                                                             ;Round2 
\ Group i    Value           Bid      1 Strategy \                   j Group ;    Value           Bid     i Strategy j 
1 9354 9355 < 1 7503 7703 < 
2 9789 9780 > 2 7865 7865 = 
3 9998 10001 < 3 8659 8659 = 
4 8915 9003 < 4 8135 10006 < 
5 9254 9253 > 5 8800 9000 < 
---■- 
6 8562 8580 < 6 7286 7350 < 
7 9687 9687 = 7 7684 7684 = 
8 9543 9543 = 8 7951 7951 = 
9 8264 9764 < 9 8256 8556 < 
10 8176 8200 < 10 8169 12000 < 
Group 3 Group 10 
Profit 218 % Var = 1.77 Profit -1837 % Var = 8.05 
Round 3 Round4 
Group I    Value           Bid      ; Strategy Group |    Value           Bid     j Strategy 
1 6824 6945 < 1 8930 8935 < 
  
2 6853 7250 < 2 8910 9000 < 
3 6950 6950 = 3 8920 8920 = 
4 6923 7004 < 4 8940 9003 < 
,.„,. 
5 6897 7001 < 5 8900 8950 < 
6 6975 7135 < 6 8960 9100 < 
7 6854 6854 = 7 8980 8980 = 
8 6910 6910 = 8 9000 9000 = 
9 6875 8875 < 9 8970 9000 < 
10 6798 7000 < 10 8950 10000 < 
Group 9 Group 10 
Profit -375 % Var = 4.45 Profit -150 % Var = 1.60 
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jRound 1 


















*/. Var = 11622.67 
Round 2 
!' Group Value Bid Strategy 
i 5ÖÖ 500 = 
2 606 650 < 
i 625 625 = 
4 550 1 > 
5 525 600 < 
6 575 57Ü > 
7 500 600 < 
8 600 601 < 
9 65Ö 65Ö = 
10 600 600 = 
Group IM 
Profit -25 <&25 % Var = 5.73 
Round 4 



























% Var = T8T 
Group Value Bid '"Strategy"; 
1 900 1000 < 
2 m Ö51 < 
3 lOöö iööi < 
4 7Ü0 lööö < 
5 650 700 < 
<i 850 850 = 
7 575 6ÖÖ < 
8 625 626 < 
9 8ÜÜ 8ÖÖ — 
10 600 6öö = 
Group 3 
Profit 1 % Var = «.25 
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: Round 1 












Experiment 5, Second Price Auction 







»/. Var = 11^17.12 
»Round 2 
"Value Bid Strategy 
1 500 500 = 
2 600 600 = 
3 625 625 = 
4 550 550 = 
5 525 526 < 
6 575 650 < 
7 5ÜÜ 500 = 
s 600 601 < 
9 65Ö 6$b = 
10 600 601 < 
Group 6&V 
Profit -50A25 % Var = i.H 
Round 4 
























% Var = TOT- 
Group Value Bid Strategy : 
1 %0 Mi = 
2 Ü5Ö 450 = 
3 65Ü 650 = 
4 700 700 = 
5 650 650 = 
6 850 i*50 = 
7 575 575 = 
8 625 626 < 
$ 6ÖÖ 625 < 
10 600 601 < 
Group 2 
Profit 50 % Var = 0.38 
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